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ABSTRACT
This thesis intends to prove that Stephen V. Ash’s model of occupation from his work,
When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, is applicable to St.
Augustine’s occupation experience in the Civil War. Three overarching themes in Ash’s work
are consistent with Civil War St. Augustine. First, that Union policy of conciliation towards
southern civilians was abandoned after the first few months of occupation due to both nonviolent and violent resistance from those civilians. Second, that Ash’s “zones of occupation” of
the occupied South, being garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land, and the Confederate frontier apply
to St. Augustine and the surrounding countryside. Finally, Ash’s assertions that the southern
community was changed by the war and Union occupation, is reflected in the massive
demographic shifts that rocked St. Augustine from 1862 to 1865. This thesis will show that all
three of Ash’s themes apply to St. Augustine’s Civil War occupation experience and confirms
the author’s generalizations about life in the occupied South.
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PREFACE
Despite numerous writings on the American Civil War, authors continually find
new approaches, topics, or sources that add to our understanding of the country’s great
conflict. Whether analyzing new social, cultural, political, or military phenomena and
events, these additions are often driven by contemporary issues, which stimulate
historians to revisit old questions with added vigor. This thesis is no different. With the
United States’ War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the question of occupying
foreign peoples and lands looms larger than ever for scholars of American history.
Military occupation escaped many Americans attention in the nearly forty years since
America’s last prolonged occupation experience—Vietnam. However, military
occupation of foreign lands by the United States military did not originate in Vietnam,
nor World War II Japan and Germany, or the Philippines; but rather in the numerous wars
with Native Americans, the Mexican-American War, and the American Civil War.
One of the U.S. Army’s first experiences with military occupation over a civilian
population across thousands of square miles occurred during the Mexican-American War.
The United States Army under Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott fought the
Mexican Army and invaded Mexico and her northern territories. Though U.S. troops did
not maintain a permanent presence in Mexico, the country’s northern territories were
ceded to, and eventually incorporated in, the United States. American forces in Mexican
territory dealt with many issues involved in military occupation like political resistance
and military insurgency. This resistance was met with repression, along with numerous
political, social, and cultural changes to the occupied areas. The few lessons of military
occupation stimulated some American officers like Henry Halleck to contemplate the
conduct of war and occupation under international law, but this did not create codified
1

regulations for such operations. Thus despite these experiences, American military and
political officials were ill prepared for the issues involved with prolonged military
occupation. It would be these same issues that would be raised over a decade later during
the Civil War. 1
Confederates viewed U.S. military units stationed in the South in the secession
crisis as occupying forces of an alien nation. Even before South Carolina state forces
fired on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, United States troops controlled forts, rail depots,
and cities in the southern states of South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, Texas, Missouri, and
Georgia. Southern state forces took some of these U.S. Army positions early in the war
with the goal of seizing all U.S. government positions and property in southern states.
However, areas under Union control only increased as the months and years of war
passed, so that by April 1865, Union commanders ruled great expanses of nearly every
Confederate state. This meant that literally hundreds of thousands of Union troops and
southern civilians interacted with each other on an almost daily basis across the occupied
South, leading to many experiences and perspectives.
1

The numerous Indian Wars, most notably the Seminole Wars, could arguably be the first experience with
U.S. military occupation. For some examples of military occupation in Florida during the Seminole Wars
see: Edward A. Mueller, “Steamboat Activity in Florida during the Second Seminole Indian War,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 4 (April, 1986): 407-431; James M. Denham, “’Some Prefer the
Seminoles’: Violence and Disorder among Soldiers and Settlers in the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842,”
Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 70, No. 1 (July, 1991): 38-64; Matthew T. Pearcy, “’The Ruthless Hand
of War’”: Andrew A. Humphreys in the Second Seminole War.” Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 85, No.
2 (Fall, 2006): 123-153; James M. Denham and Keith L. Hueycutt, “’Everything is Hubbub Here’: Lt.
James Willoughby Anderson’s Second Seminole War, 1837-1842,” Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 82,
No. 3 (Winter, 2004): 313-359. For more information on American military occupation of territories lost in
the Mexican-American War see: James O’Brien, 'Military Government of Mexico by American Forces
under General Winfield Scott,’ Reports of the United States Army War College, Historical Section, May
1943; Durwood Ball, “By Right of Conquest: Military Government in New Mexico and California, 18461851,” Journal of the West, (2002) 8-16. A new dissertation by Thomas W. Spahr actually breaks with
current work on military occupation in the Mexican-American War by claiming that such occupation was
not sparse or brief but in fact widespread, carefully planned by the Polk administration, and well executed
by regular army officers, though this led to eventual atrocities and other negative effects on Mexico after
the war, Thomas W. Spahr, “Occupying for Peace, the U.S. Army in Mexico, 1846-1848,” (PhD diss., The
Ohio State University Press, 2011).
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Despite the work of many capable historians, Florida’s prolonged military
occupation remains lightly treated. This thesis seeks to apply Stephen V. Ash’s model of
occupation described in his work, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the
Occupied South, 1861-1865 to a Florida city, with the goal of testing Ash’s conclusions
and generalizations. This thesis contends that St. Augustine, Florida serves as a
successful test case for Ash’s occupation model applied on the local level and verifies
Ash’s assertions that southern resistance led to changes in the United States’ war aims
and policy, that this resistance created three unique spheres of influence called “zones of
occupation,” and that the conflicts experienced under occupation changed the southern
community during the war. 2
Authors provided scant treatment to the experiences and perspectives of
southerners under military occupation for many years after the Civil War. This treatment
was usually indirect, often associated with works on state histories, regimental histories,
biographies, and memoirs. Regimental histories were narrowly focused on a particular
regiment, detailing the men of the regiment, the battles they fought in, and the places they
visited, without any analysis. Henry F. W. Little’s The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire
Volunteers in the War of Rebellion published in 1896 illustrates this trend. Though the
work does contain descriptions of southern cities that the regiment occupied during the
war, it only briefly describes the most exciting military events, comments on the
appearance of the city, and moves on to the next great event in the regiment’s service.

2

For recent scholarly works on aspects of military occupation in Florida see: George F. Pearce, Pensacola
during the Civil War: A Thorn in the Side of the Confederacy. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press,
2000); George E. Buker, Blockaders, Refugees, & Contrabands: Civil War on Florida’s Gulf Coast, 18611865. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Daniel L. Schafer, Thunder on the River: The Civil
War in Northeast Florida. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010).
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These histories paralleled and reflected the national mood of reconciliation after the war.
Veterans’ organizations were among the first to adopt the stance of national
reconciliation and through their publications they attempted to frame the war as a conflict
between white brothers. This focus led to the glossing over of the sacrifices of African
Americans, women, Unionists, as well as larger social, cultural, and labor issues that
occurred during the war. 3
Regimental histories were not the only publications to gloss over military
occupation in favor of large battles or political events during and after the war.
Reconstruction studies often picked up with the end of the Civil War and focused on
postwar political events in the South. One example of these Reconstruction studies is
William Watson Davis’ work The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, published in
1913. This work describes Florida from the antebellum period to the end of
Reconstruction, the bulk of the book lists the larger military events and politics of Florida
from 1860-1877. Considering this book’s political and military focus, only a minor
portion of this study deals with military occupation during the war and its affect on the
southern home front. The Dunning School, a historiographical viewpoint that emerged
from Professor William Dunning at Columbia University in the early twentieth century,
also heavily influences this work. The Dunning School argued that Congressional and
Radical Reconstruction governments were corrupt, inefficient, and abusive to southern
whites and painted the reassertion of southern white Democrat “redemption” rule of state

3

Regimental histories include: Henry F. W. Little, The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the
War of Rebellion. (Concord, NH, The Seventh New Hampshire Veteran Association, 1896); Gaines M.
Foster, “Veterans Organizations and Memories of the War,” in Steven E. Woodworth, eds. The American
Civil War: A Handbook to Literature and Research. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996): 586-570; Kory
Leland Meyernik, Printed Sources: A Guide To Published Genealogical Records. (Ancestry Publishing,
1998): 479.
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governments, after the election of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877, as a beneficial
occurrence to the South. This line of inquiry was influenced by racial biases associated
with Jim Crow, which emphasized the “incapacity” of African Americans to participate
in government. This school of thought produced works that demonized African
American, northern settler (carpetbagger), and southern Republican (scalawag)
involvement in Reconstruction government. 4
These two approaches dominated Civil War historiography for the first eight
decades after the war and would continue to reemerge in decades of historiography to
come. However, questions arose in the 1940s about American military involvement in
foreign lands and the historical origins of this precedent. This change can be attributed to
American participation in World War II, the emergence of total war, and the subsequent
military occupation of Germany and Japan. Historians point to this war as one of the
major factors in raising questions among historians about the historical origins for total
war and military occupation. 5
Howard Palmer Johnson, “New Orleans under General Butler,” and Joseph Parks
“Memphis Under Military Rule, 1862-1865,” published in 1941 and 1942, are good
examples of the beginning of local studies of the occupied South. 6 These works discussed
broad tangible consequences of military occupation that occurred inside New Orleans,

4

William Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida. (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1913); Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction, 1863-1877. (Grand Rapids: Harper Perennial,
1990): 258; Eric Foner, Forever Free: The Story of Emancipation and Reconstruction. (New York:
Random House, Inc., 2006): xxi.
5
Mark Grimsley, “A Directed Severity: The Evolution Of Federal Policy Toward Southern Civilians And
Property, 1861-1865,” (PhD diss.,The Ohio State University, 1992), 4.
6
Howard Palmer Johnson, “New Orleans under General Butler.” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 24
(1941): 434–536; Joseph Parks, “Memphis Under Military Rule, 1862-1865,” The East Tennessee
Historical Society Publications, Volume 14, (1942): 31-58 cited in Richard M. Zuczek, “Southern
Occupation,” in Steven E. Woodworth, eds. The American Civil War: A Handbook to Literature and
Research. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996): 548.
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Louisiana and Memphis, Tennessee. These works discussed the actions of a leading
politician or general in an occupied city; like issues of censorship, expulsions, inflation,
social chaos, banditry, guerrillas, prostitution, and many other phenomena of occupied
life. These factors are briefly discussed and then abandoned without further analysis for
the next local event of fame. Some local studies, like Parks, emphasized the hardships of
civilians, who saw economic privations, social change, humiliation, and martial law
during occupation. Other historians including Johnson, judiciously discussed some
benefits of occupation, like security, economic recovery, sanitation improvements, and
public schools. However, authors list events without much analysis. This would be a
continuous trend among local studies of the occupied South for several decades.
Shortly after these initial local works on military occupation, historians began
exploring macro-historical questions of overarching American experiences with aspects
of modern war that they believed originated in the nineteenth century. The first work to
discuss military government on a larger scale was Ralph Gabriel’s “The American
Experience with Military Government,” published in 1944. The author discusses the
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and
World War II in his discussion of military government. However, Gabriel pays minimal
attention to the Civil War period, devoting less than three pages to the war. Despite this
brevity, in only one sentence Gabriel managed to expose one of the major gaps in Civil
War historiography when he stated, “The rule of the [Union] generals in the South was
one of the longer American experiences with military government.” Though he did not
expand on this concept, the author did make clear that further inquiry into military
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government and occupation was necessary, because of the latitude given Union generals
occupying southern states. 7
Robert J. Futrell continued this macro approach to military occupation with his
article, “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865,” published in 1951. His
work claimed that Union commanders often had little or no instructions in the first two
years of the war from the Lincoln administration with regards to governing occupied
areas. Due to the lack of instructions, Union commanders had to improvise and devise an
occupation administration strategy, which in some cases promoted southern local
government and legal entities. At the same time, these generals wielded immense power
over not just the U. S. Army, but over the civilians in the territory the army occupied.
Futrell argued that the majority of actions taken by occupying commanders were well
founded, measured responses, and supported local civilian courts and rule. Thus,
according to Futrell, Union commanders produced overarching policies aimed at
alleviating the suffering of soldier and civilian alike in the occupied South. However,
Futrell showed the continuing influence of the Dunning School in his one line about postwar occupation and Reconstruction when he stated, “[a]t the end of Confederate
resistance, a majority of Federal Commanders expressed a desire for speedy restoration
of Southern governments. Unfortunately, such sound counsel would not prevail, and
Federal military government, conceived as a necessity for successful military operations,
would be perpetuated for political purposes during the ‘reconstruction’ of the South.” 8
Futrell, like many scholars, still viewed Reconstruction through the Dunning School of
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Ralph H. Gabriel, “The American Experience with Military Government,” The American Historical
Review, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July, 1944): pp.630-643, 639; Grimsley, “A Directed Severity,” 4.
8
Robert J. Futrell, “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865,” Military Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4
(Winter, 1951): pp. 181-191, quoted on 191, emphasis not in original.
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thought, which viewed the period as corrupt and detrimental to white southerners. Years
would pass before scholars judiciously reviewed the Reconstruction era in Civil War
historiography. Futrell, however, would not be the last historian who viewed military
occupation through the prism of official policy, while ignoring its effect on populations
other than white men. 9
Large overarching works that viewed wartime occupation like Gabriel and Futrell
were few and far between. The majority of scholarship done from the 1940s to the1980s
was typical of the trends established by Parks and Johnson. Scholars like Gilbert Govan
and James Livingood who examined Chattanooga and Peter Maslowski work on
occupied Nashville were similar in many ways to the earlier studies of Memphis and New
Orleans. Local studies continued to be produced on military occupation as historians
analyzed specific aspects of occupation. Though authors like Gerald M. Capers improved
upon the existing literature of local occupation studies, these additions merely replayed
less well-known aspects of military occupation in a particular city. These additions also
had limited corresponding analysis that linked the local incidents to larger events of the
war, or to similar factors or phenomena occurring elsewhere in the occupied South. 10

9

Foner, Forever Free, xxi.
Gilbert E. Govan & James W. Livingood, “Chattanooga Under Military Occupation, 1863-1865,”
Journal of Southern History, 17 (February 1951): 23-47; Peter Maslowski, Treason Must be Made Odious:
Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, Tennessee, 1862-1865. (Millwood, NY:
KTO Press, 1978); for the continuation of local studies for certain occupied cities, good examples are:
Gerald M. Capers, Occupied City: New Orleans Under the Federals, 1862-1865. (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1965); Dale A. Somers, “War and Play: The Civil War in New Orleans,” Mississippi
Quarterly 26 (1973): 3-28; Gary Mills, "Alexandria, Louisiana: a 'Confederate' City at War with Itself."
Red River Valley Historical Review 5(1) (Winter, 1980): 23–36; Fedora Small Frank, “Nashville during the
Civil War,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 39 (1980): 310-322; Ludwell H. Johnson III, “Blockade or
Trade Monopoly: John A. Dix and the Union Occupation of Norfolk,” Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography 93 (1985): 54-78; Edward L. White III, “Key West during the Civil War: An Island of
Discontent?” Southern Historian 11 (1988): 38-50; David C. Humphrey, “A ‘Very Muddy and Conflicting’
View: The Civil War as Seen from Austin, Texas” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 94 (1991): 368-414;
Dora Alford, “A Decade of Change, Austin County, Texas, 1860-1870,” South Texas Studies 5, (1994):
131-163.
10

8

One such factor, African Americans under Union military occupation, received
increasing attention from scholars with the rise of the Civil Rights movement in the
1960s. Historians looked at topics like the care given to freedmen and the enforcement of
equal provisions by the army, as well as the extensive relief work of the freedmen’s
bureau after the war. Though these works tend to focus on postwar Reconstruction and
occupation rather than during the conflict itself, these publications illustrate the
divergence of Reconstruction and African American studies from works on wartime
occupation, a trend that continues to exist in Civil War historiography. Two early
examples of this trend published in 1968 are John Kirkland’s “Federal Troops in the
South Atlantic States during Reconstruction, 1865-1877,” and James Sefton, The United
States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877. One historian described Kirkland’s work as
a “tedious […] list of duties punctuated by sweeping hypotheses that are introduced and
abruptly passed over without development.” 11 Sefton suffered similar problems with
large gaps in his treatment of the army’s enforcement of civilian policy. Furthermore,
both authors view occupation during Reconstruction in a microcosm, divorced from the
war itself when military occupation was first established in parts of the South. 12
As Reconstruction studies diverged into its own category separate from works on
wartime occupation, several other topics that affected or were affected by U. S. Army
occupation began receiving further treatment during the 1970s with the rise of social
history. Not content to just view events from the top down, scholars sought to explore the
bulk of individuals who fought in or experienced the war, but were not politicians, army
11

Quoted in Zuczek, “Southern Occupation,” 548; John Kirkland, “Federal Troops in the South Atlantic
States during Reconstruction, 1865-1877,” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1968).
12
James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1968). For an extended discussion of the divergence between African
American/Reconstruction and wartime occupation studies, see Zuczek, “Southern Occupation,” 547-556.
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officers, or the elite. These scholars were primarily concerned with the great unspoken
masses during the Civil War including women, slaves, freedmen, poor whites,
immigrants, and others who had been glossed over by political and military historians.
Social history helped create the second overarching literature theme for Civil War
historiography that differed from strict military or political histories of southern
occupation. The topic of the Confederate and Union “home front” began rising as an allinclusive popular research theme that held under its purview the specific topics of social
conditions like community, dissent, and women’s studies. 13
Subtopics of “the home front,” are: (1) Community studies or how communities
change over the course of the Civil War. (2) Works on dissent which focuses on
Unionists and guerrillas. (3) Women’s histories that emphasize the role of women as
active agents during the war. Each subtopic has its own historiographical trends and
patterns which will only be briefly examined here due to their depth. Within community
studies, aspects of the Confederate home front like the forging of nationalism, the role of
community in morale and motivation, the social make up of secessionists, Unionists, and
others were all factors that received attention from the 1970s until today. 14 Similarly, in
works on dissent, scholars have explored Unionists and guerrillas in greater detail as they
have expanded upon the limited analysis in the beginning of the twentieth century, to

13

For a discussion on works pertaining to the southern home front see: Bill Cecil-Fronsman, “Southern
Social Conditions,” in Steven E. Woodworth, eds. The American Civil War: A Handbook to Literature and
Research. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996): 530-536.
14
For rural southern community and home front studies, see: James L. Roark, Masters Without Slaves:
Southern Planters in the Civil War and Reconstruction. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1977); Randolph
B. Campbell, A Southern Community in Crisis: Harrison County, Texas, 1850-1880. (Austin: State
Historical Association, 1983); J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society: White Liberty
and Black Slavery in Augusta’s Hinterlands. (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1985);
Robert C. Kenzer, Kinship and Neighborhood in a Southern Community: Orange County, North Carolina,
1849-1881. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987); Wayne K. Durrill, War of Another Kind: A
Southern Community in the Great Rebellion. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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provide a deep and vibrant picture of varying degrees of the prevalence of Unionists and
guerrillas in the South. 15 Lastly, women’s histories have grown to illustrate the vast roles
that women had on the home front, from supporting soldiers to being the primary
recipient of U.S. occupation policies and experiences. Each facet of home front studies
has affected works on southern occupation in ways that are too detailed to note en masse,
except to say that these trends parallel the work accomplished by “occupation” historians,
add to their body of work, while reinforcing previous assertions about the chaotic nature
of southern society at war. 16
All of these trends intermingled in the late 1980s, producing studies that analyzed
other factors of military occupation from freedmen to Unionists to women. These new
works provided a more complete picture of the massive changes that rocked southern
communities occupied by Union forces. The most representative of these works, both
published in 1988, are Stuart C. McGehee’s, “Military Origins of the New South,” and
15

For works on dissent, Unionism, and guerrillas in the Confederacy, see: Allen Burton Moore,
Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy. (New York: Macmillan, 1924); Ella Lonn, Desertion during
the Civil War. (New York: Century, 1928); Georgia L. Tatum, Disloyalty in the Confederacy. (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1934); Stephen E. Ambrose, “Yeomen Discontent in the Confederacy,”
Civil War History 8, (1962): 259-268; improvements on earlier Unionist overviews include: Paul D. Escott,
“Southern Yeomen and the Confederacy,” South Atlantic Quarterly 77 (1978): 146-158; Carl Degler, The
Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century. (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Phillip
S. Paludan, Victims: A True Story of the Civil War. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981);
Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865. (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1984); Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri
During the American Civil War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Richard N. Current,
Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992);
Donald E. Sutherland, “Getting the ‘Real War’ into the History Books,” Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography 98 (1990): 193-222; Donald E. Sutherland eds. Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the
Confederate Home Front. (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1999); Robert Russell Mackey,
The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2005); Donald E. Sutherland, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American
Civil War. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
16
Francis B. Simpkins and James W. Patton, The Women of the Confederacy. (Richmond: 1936); Mary
Elizabeth Massey, Bonnet Brigades (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1966); Bell Irvin Wiley, Confederate Women
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); Catherine Clinton, The Other Civil War: American Women in the
Nineteenth Century. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984); George C. Rable, Civil Wars: Women and the
Crisis of Southern Nationalism. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1989); Catherine Clinton and Nina Sibler
eds. Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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Stephen V. Ash’s Middle Tennessee Society Transformed, 1860-1870: War and Peace in
the Upper South. 17 Both works take the effects of the Union army during the war and
show how it affected the Reconstruction period in Tennessee. Each work is interested in
specific phenomena, McGehee in freedmen and Ash who focuses on the larger changes to
the white community and adjustment to emancipation. However, they both are
representative of the effects of social history on occupation studies, which blended
political, military, and social history into a powerful synthesis that illustrated the great
destruction in Tennessee in a way unmatched by previous works.
Not content to keep his conclusions about community change confined to Middle
Tennessee; Stephen V. Ash’s When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the
Occupied South, 1861-1865, published in 1995, tracks commonalities among military
occupation throughout the occupied South. 18 Ash details how white southerners initially
accepted occupation for fear they would be exterminated. Once white southerners
realized the Union adopted a “rose water” or conciliatory approach—meaning that U.S.
troops wanted to only punish those they viewed as a small group of fire eating
secessionists without harming the greater population—southerners began resisting Union
troops. This was done through nonviolent means of insults and refusing to socialize or
take the oath of loyalty, as well as violent means such as guerrilla warfare. Ash then
discusses his theory of the zones of occupation, three distinct worlds called garrisoned
towns, no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier. These distinct experiences were
17

Stuart C. McGehee, “Military Origins of the New South: The Army of the Cumberland and
Chattanooga’s Freedmen,” Civil War History 34 (1988): 323-343; Stephen V. Ash, Middle Tennessee
Society Transformed, 1860-1870: War and Peace in the Upper South. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988).
18
Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
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created by the proximity of Union forces in the areas. Union forces concentrated in a
single town or city called garrisoned towns. These garrisoned towns were surrounded by
no-man’s-land, an area that U.S. troops frequently foraged in and patrolled. This noman’s-land ran up to the Confederate frontier, an area that was under Confederate control
but not immune to Union incursions. Lastly, Ash outlines how the war inflicted changes
that shook southern communities. These changes ranged from the depopulation of
garrisoned towns and no-man’s-land, which resulted in a refugee crisis and broke up
communities due to the depredations of occupation, to the destruction of slavery and race
controls in the occupied South. 19
Ash’s work remains the single largest occupation model yet employed across the
occupied South. The author tried to synthesize the growing body of work done on the
occupied South, an approach historians increasingly adopted in the 1990s. However, this
work only tracks the privation of southern whites, without giving any consideration to
variations among Union soldiers, the actions of African Americans, or black soldiers.
This is due to the author’s stated scope of focusing solely on the experience of white
southern communities and the changes it underwent. Ash states he decided to maintain
his focus on the white southern community under wartime occupation because of the
large body of existing literature on African Americans in the occupied South and
Reconstruction, reflecting the existing division between occupation, African American,
and Reconstruction studies. Furthermore, Ash’s work is representative of a relatively new
trend in historiography called “new military history.” New military history attempted to
fill the gaps of traditional military history, which analyzed large battles, armies, and
tactics, by explaining how battlefield success and failures affected life for civilians on the
19
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home front. Though this new trend incorporated works from other fields of history, many
of its proponents admit that it lagged behind other groups in adopting new historiographic
approaches. 20
This new military history influenced scholars of war, military occupation, the
home front, Unionists, guerrillas, Reconstruction, international law, and a host of other
subtopics. A good example of this influence is Mark Grimsley’s The Hard Hand of War:
Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 published in 1997.
Grimsley faulted historians for missing the mark when discussing military policy and the
Civil War as the nation’s first total war. 21 Grimsley argued that too often historians did
not delineate how and why Union military policy evolved from a conciliatory approach
from 1861-1863, to a pragmatic policy from 1863-1864, to one of “hard war” from 18641865. These policies were not uniform and had many caveats and facets that existed
throughout all three periods, affecting the southern home front in a variety of ways.
Furthermore, Grimsley shows that Union commanders often adapted the orders to the
situations on the ground, but in the end, all commanders recognized the validity of
labeling some civilians as non-belligerents, preventing them from crossing the precipice
into unrestrained total war. 22 This work shows that the nuance and subtlety is important
in delineating the Civil War as different from a total war and is now indispensible for
20
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anyone seeking to cover military occupation. By the end of the 1990s, new military
history had furthered the analysis of the war’s impact on southern civilians. Ash with his
focus on the general experiences of white southern civilians and Grimsley with his focus
on military policy toward white and black southern civilians represented the core
approaches to any new military history of the occupied South.
However, this core approach would be disrupted by the last major leap in military
occupation studies, represented by Judkin Browning’s recent book, Shifting Loyalties:
The Union Occupation of Eastern North Carolina, published in 2011. Browning forges
his own approach to occupation studies by explicitly stating that he is neither concerned
with policy or large generalizations, but how occupation played out on the ground in one
location, Eastern North Carolina. Furthermore, the author has three main thrusts to his
focus; that white southerners adapted and shifted loyalties when the situation suited or
was necessary and even then it did not mean the repudiation of southern culture and
white supremacy, that this shifting confused and angered U.S. Army soldiers, who not
only effected occupation but were themselves affected by it, and lastly, that African
Americans were not passive players but savvy pragmatists who used U. S. Army soldiers
and benevolent societies to obtain the “four pillars of empowerment, escape,
employment, enlistment, and education.” 23 This approach makes Browning the most
comprehensive in terms of tracking southern white, African American, and Union troop
experiences during military occupation in the Civil War. This work also represents how
new military history has grown in the past thirty years, by combing topics that were
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commonly separated in wartime military occupation, Reconstruction, and African
American studies.
Historians produced many works about specific locales under, or phenomena
associated with, military occupation during the Civil War. So many different approaches,
topics, and areas received treatment, that it is unwieldy to analyze them all. Nor can a
comparison between models be successfully completed without extensive analysis into
both approaches to see commonalities and contrasts. To successfully employ models of
occupation, each model needs to be tested in a locale to determine its applicability with
the goal of ultimately combining both approaches to analyze military occupation.
Therefore, this thesis seeks to focus on the most pronounced overarching study of Civil
War military occupation, Stephen V. Ash’s When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos
in the Occupied South, 1861-1865.
Ash’s model was chosen because it was the only model that covered the entire
occupied South and provided overarching themes and generalizations about the conduct
of military occupation. However, the model is limited because it focuses solely on white
southerners, generalizes Union soldiers, fails to capture the complexity of the move from
conciliation to hard war, treats African Americans as passive players, and completely
ignores black soldiers. The model also overlooks variation and unique attributes, which
complicate military occupation, like topography. Despite these flaws, Ash’s model
remains the largest occupation study to date and has been utilized by scholarly works on
the Civil War. Furthermore, the majority of research for this thesis was done prior to
Browning’s comprehensive study on Union occupation and the scope of the Browning’s
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work precludes itself from a successful treatment in this thesis. Lastly, Ash’s model has
yet to be applied to many areas of the occupied South, particularly Florida. 24
This thesis will tackle Ash’s three overarching themes that link together the
experience of the occupied South: (1) The Union’s evolving war aims from conciliation
to hard war as it incurred southern resistance. (2) The variation in the experiences of
southerners residing in three unique spheres of the occupied South. (3) The array of
conflicts that followed in the wake of the Union army, which changed the antebellum
southern community. This thesis seeks to use a southern city as a test case to see if Ash’s
occupation model and his assertions about occupied life apply to a specific city in
Florida. 25
The southern city to be used as the test case is St. Augustine, Florida. The choice
of this city is due to its continual occupation by Union forces from March 1862 until
1868, the prevalence of other garrisoned towns in Northeast Florida, the town’s lack of
extensive treatment by Civil War scholars, and the numerous unused primary sources
describing the town’s occupation by Union troops and government officials. Historians
including Omega G. East, Thomas Graham, George Buker, David J. Coles, and others
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have written works that dealt with the Ancient City during the Civil War. 26 Ash mentions
St. Augustine a couple of times in his large occupation study, though in both regards, the
work done on St. Augustine is lacking in depth, detail, and perspective, which warrants
another scholarly look. 27
Naturally, this thesis cannot cover every facet of Ash’s work on occupation nor
can it fill every gap in the discussion of St Augustine’s Civil War experience, so it is
necessary to delineate which portions of Ash’s model will not be addressed. Ash’s
generalizations about rural communalism and class conflict will not be explored, for as
Ash states, class conflict in the occupied South was the least prevalent of confrontations
that influenced community change. 28 Furthermore, because of Ash’s neglect of African
American agency and black soldiers, this thesis will also avoid this topic, as the sources
and information available is too great to be successfully discussed in the available space.
What this thesis will illustrate is that Ash’s three overarching themes are applicable to St.
Augustine and are instructive in illustrating how space, time, and events played a role in
26
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conflicts among Unionists, guerrillas, African Americans, and Union troops in the
Ancient City.
In keeping with Ash’s organization, the first chapter of this thesis will briefly
overview St. Augustine on the eve of the Civil War to show her southern nationalism,
pro-secessionist attitudes, the fear of U.S. invasion, and condition of the city upon the
arrival of U.S. Navy gunboats in March 1862. The second chapter will detail the
applicability of Ash’s model during the early occupation period, March 1862 to January
1863. The chapter will introduce and discuss Ash’s three overarching themes that this
thesis seeks to test, in the early occupation period: (1) The Union’s policy of conciliation
met southern civilian resistance resulting in the Union Army’s change of war aims. (2)
The zones of occupation, being garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land and the Confederate
frontier, apply to St. Augustine and the surrounding countryside. (3) That military
occupation caused substantial changes to the southern community. The third chapter will
extend the analysis of these three themes to the late occupation period, January 1863 to
April 1865. Lastly, the conclusion will overview the successful application of Ash’s
occupation model to St. Augustine and will propose future avenues of inquiry into St.
Augustine’s occupation.
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CHAPTER ONE: ST. AUGUSTINE IN THE SECESSION CRISIS
AND CONFEDERACY
In his work on occupation, Stephen V. Ash spends a limited portion describing
the lead up to the Civil War, merely giving an overview of overarching southern thought
on southern nationalism, secession, community, and the coming war. Ash describes many
facets of southern communities in the lead up and first year of the war as being: (1) Prosouthern but not uniformly secessionist. (2) Once these communities seceded, they
encountered privations from the lack of trade with the North. (3) Southerners feared
Union invasion so much that panicked evacuations occurred when enemy troops were
sited. In keeping with Ash’s formats this chapter will provide an overview of the years
before secession to illustrate the southern nationalism and pro-secessionist beliefs of
some of the town’s population, as well as how it fits with Ash’s model. Then this chapter
will describe the condition of St. Augustine when U.S. forces landed there in March
1862. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the initial evacuation and occupation of St.
Augustine, which left southern civilians cautious and fearful of Union depredations.
Historian Thomas Graham argues that the critical moment for the country and St.
Augustine that led to the Civil War came in the fall of 1859 with John Brown’s raid on
Harpers Ferry, Virginia. This raid was an attempt by John Brown and his followers to
initiate a slave insurrection in Virginia by seizing weapons at a government arsenal in
Harpers Ferry. Brown, who the St. Augustine Examiner stated was of “Kansas nortoriety”
and “the distinguished Ossawatomic free-soiler and outlaw,” was known among St.
Augustinians for his supporters’ bloody exploits in Kansas, where they killed men with
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broadswords in the 1850s. 29 But sectional tension did not just begin with John Brown’s
raid. In the decades prior to the war, political wrangling over slavery’s expansion in U.S.
territories created crisis after crisis over the fate of the nation. The issue of states’ rights,
southern nationalism, and secession was linked to the right of southerners to take their
“property” into the territories. Newspapers across the South had mottos and headlines
that espoused this belief. The motto of the St. Augustine Examiner stated “Equality in the
Union and Nothing Less.” 30
St. Augustine’s newspapers reported in great detail John Brown’s actions,
subsequent trial, and execution. Tensions remained high even after Brown and his
accomplices were hanged. The fear of slave insurrection haunted the South in the
antebellum period, and this attempt by a northerner to incite such an insurrection sent
shockwaves throughout the country. Occasional slave patrols, which were in effect for
years, were shifted from local citizenry to the Florida Independent Blues. The Blues was
a seventy-nine-man militia company raised by John L. Phillips and L. M. Andreu in May
1860 and was eventually integrated into Confederate service in the Third Florida
Infantry. 31 With the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, the majority of
southerners feared that the “Black Republican” would abolish slavery in the states,
devastating their way of life economically, culturally, and socially. St. Augustine, like the
rest of the South, feared this prospect too. The St. Augustine Examiner, on the eve of the
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election, answered its own question on “What Shall Florida do?” if Lincoln were elected,
“Secede of course!” 32
Secession was not only favored by many of the prominent men of St. Augustine,
but by many women from different backgrounds. Frances Kirby Smith, mother to future
Confederate General Edmund Kirby Smith, was an example of the fire-eater spirit among
many of the women and men of the Ancient City. In numerous letters to her son serving
on the western frontier, Mrs. Smith wrote passionately about secession, which dominated
the conversations in St. Augustine. So fervent were her words that her son marveled at
her spirit even at the age of seventy. “You are enthusiastic, my dear mother, on the topics
of the day. The excitement must be intense, the perils great, when a sober, staid old lady
of more than seventy writes as you do.” 33 Other women, like Clarissa Anderson, were
less impassioned in their zeal for immediate secession, though she suspected northerners
who stayed in St. Augustine were planning “abolitionist plots against the Southern
people.” 34 Distrust of northerners and a consistent support for southern independence
would be severely tested in the coming years of war and occupation.
As Ash describes across the South, though support for states’ rights, slavery, and
southern independence was popular, it was by no means universal. This is also true in the
Ancient City. Prominent families in St. Augustine, like the Dunhams, feared that chaos
would plunge the city into a calamity it could ill afford, given the city’s years of decline
during the 1840s and 1850s. David R. Dunham, a prominent citizen of St. Augustine,
32
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feared the “Blue Cockade of Secessionists” would ruin the county and state by seceding
from the Union. 35 Despite these few dissenting voices, southern nationalism and states’
rights remained popular among most of St. Augustine’s population. This is evidenced by
the results of the election of 1860. Democrat John C. Breckinridge, who pledged a U.S.
code to protect slavery’s expansion into the territories, outpolled John Bell of Tennessee,
who pledged to preserve the Union, by 211 to 74 in St. Johns County. 36
After the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, the state of Florida
began preparing a secession convention in Tallahassee, which delegates from every
county would attend to vote on an ordinance of secession. On December 15, 1860, the St.
Augustine Examiner states that prominent citizens of St. Augustine convened in the
courthouse and nominated Matthew Solana and R. G. Mays as delegates to represent St.
Johns County and the seventeenth senatorial district. In a written address accepting his
nomination on December 19, 1860, Matthew Solana stated, “I will be up to the spirit of
your resolutions, and pledge myself to vote for immediate secession as being the only
expedient for our Southern States!” Likewise R. G. Mays in his letter of acceptance stated
on December 17, 1860 that, “[I] pledge myself if elected to act in accordance with your
instructions, as they entierly [sic] accord with my own convictions, and in my judgment
is the only course left us consistent with our honor and safety.” 37
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A week later on December 29, 1860, the St. Augustine Examiner described the
popular vote that had occurred on December 22,
The election passed off very quietly and many did not vote there being no
opposition and a prevalent opinion among all classes as to the necessity of
resistance. Dr. Mays and Mr. Solana will represent ‘old St. Johns’ in the
constitutional convention and are both pledged to carry out the will of a large
majority of her people—they will vote for immediate and separate state action in
the immediate withdrawal of Florida from the Union. 38
Secession was adopted by the constitutional convention on January 7, 1861, with both
Solana and Mays, voting in favor of the ordinance.
Ash states that across the South with the adoption of secession, trade and tourism
with the North ended, which created painful economic stagnation. This also holds true for
St. Augustine. With independence, the Ancient City began its year of home rule by
cutting off many of the town’s traditional ties to the North. Many Minorcans wanted to
prevent the arrival of northern ships, and business owners would not accept money
backed by northern banks. Writing years later about the flight of northerners from Florida
following secession, John Francis Tenney commented, “the notes of war admonished us
that Yankees were neither needed nor popular in the limits of the Southern
Confederacy.” 39 Hannah Jenckes tried to keep her friends informed of the events going
on inside the Ancient City, though she admitted that with the departure of so many people
and breaking off ties with the North, things were “dull beyond belief.” 40
Confederate mobilization occurred in cities across the South in the months before
the firing on Fort Sumter, South Carolina. Southerners confiscated United States property
38
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before the war to consolidate their strength and end the remaining Union presence in their
midst. Florida’s secession convention stated all military installations were to be seized
and held, as St. Augustinian David Levy Yulee advised his statesmen that the U.S.
government would try to reinforce those forts if left alone. On January 7, 1861, a party of
Fernandina and St. Augustine militia confronted Union Ordinance Sergeant Henry
Douglas at Fort Marion in the Ancient City. After raising objections, the sergeant
relinquished the keys to the fort and the rebels came into possession of three thirty-two
pound canons, two eight inch sea howitzers, modified flintlock muskets, and some small
arms. 41 Over a week later on January 15, 1861, “authorities” in St. Augustine confiscated
a coastal survey ship, the Dana, while the U.S. officer in command was away performing
his duties. Northern newspapers were livid; “Federal Rights Violated!” exclaimed the
headline in the New York Times and Confederate property seizures remained one of the
rallying points for northerners during the secession crisis. 42
In March 1861, news reached St. Augustine that Abraham Lincoln in his
inaugural address pledged he would regain stolen government property. This immediately
caused a stir in St. Augustine. Nightly patrols were organized, masters were told to
ensure their slaves were in their quarters every night, boats were to be secured at nightfall
to prevent anyone from contacting U.S. Navy ships, and the town’s lighthouse was
extinguished. On April 19, 1861, Abraham Lincoln announced the U.S. blockade of
southern ports. This blockade encouraged many shippers from the town to take up the
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wartime job of blockade running, and this endeavor was aided by groups of exuberant
young St. Augustinians who extinguished lighthouses up and down Florida’s east coast.
Ash asserts that this occurred all over the South in the lead up to war, as nervous
Confederates who lived on the coast were aware that they were well within striking
distance of Union troops and warships. 43
In addition to fear of invasion, St. Augustine, like most southern cities, began
experiencing problems from the lack of trade and tourism with the North that exacerbated
a growing budget problem after secession. Food prices rose, and citizens began planting
crops in their small gardens to supplement their diets with potatoes and other produce.
Blockade-runners like the St. Marys would occasionally bring food to St. Augustine, but
these shipments were too few and far between to consistently feed the city’s hungry
population. Writing to a friend, Benjamin Wright stated that those in St. Augustine who
were not “too poor” were leaving, as St. Augustine dealt with provision shortages.
Despite these hardships, the ladies of St. Augustine “liberally provided for the families”
of the town’s militia, while the soldiers were away on patrol duty. This was greeted with
public pronouncements in the St. Augustine Examiner from the company’s officers
offering profound thanks for the patriotism and charity of the community. 44
Ash also contends that in the first year of the war, not everyone in Confederate
service could tolerate the new circumstances and privations associated with
43
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independence. In November 1861, two Confederate army deserters from St. Augustine
stole a small sailboat and set out to join the U.S. Navy blockading off the coast. The two
deserters made it all the way to Brunswick, Georgia before being picked up by the Union
ship Mohican. 45 Ash details that in many coastal towns of the South, Confederate
deserters and Unionists kept contact with Union gunboats right up to occupation. Hannah
Jenckes on the eve of the Confederate pullout from St. Augustine commented, “It has
leaked out that some one three or four days since had been out to the [Union] vessels, But
it is kept secret who it is. S--y and her son in law B. are suspected, at all events a guard of
17 escorted them to the Boats that took the blues to Smyrna. I hope they may be shot.” 46
The St. Augustine Independent Blues were engaged in state service patrolling the
coast from January to August 1861. The militia unit was organized into Confederate
service on August 5, 1861. The seventy-nine recruits who first signed up that year later
grew to ninety-nine, forming Company B of the Third Florida Infantry. The company
was unique from other regular Confederate units because the regiment had three recruits
of African American or mixed-race descent. Sons and fathers of prominent families like
the Dunhams and Phillips’ served in the unit during the war, though many well-to-do
citizens like the Anderson’s hired substitutes to serve in their stead. After the regiment’s
organization, many companies were sent in late 1861 to help bolster defenses across
Northeast Florida, with the Blues remaining in St. Augustine to guard against any
incursions by the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, just like St. Augustine, other cities on the
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coast or near Union-patrolled rivers kept troops nearby to guard against raids from Union
troops aboard U.S. Navy gunboats. 47
The town remained quiet for the remainder of the year; only the testing of a
cannon that startled the population in November 1861 produced any excitement for the
Ancient City. The Blues served in Fernandina for a short time, returning to St. Augustine
in late January 1862. Recalling their time in St. Augustine, C. Seaton Fleming of the
Second Florida Regiment, wrote that “this service in St. Augustine […] in which the
indulgence of an evening entertainment, or a moonlight promenade on the seawall (and
not always with one’s file leader as a companion) was not an unfrequent recreation after
the less delightful occupation of the day, and was indeed the poetry of war; and the only
wounds received by the company were from the arrows of Cupid, who at that time was a
successful rival to Mars.” 48 Their enjoyable service in the Ancient City would not last
long.
In March 1862, Confederate forces in the city were ordered to remove some of the
cannons and all of their troops from St. Augustine’s defense. This was due in part to
Robert E. Lee’s opinion that “the garrison at St. Augustine only serves as an invitation to
attack,” when he toured the coastal defenses of the Department of South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida. 49 The tactical situation in Florida was further complicated when
Confederate Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, ordered Confederate forces to
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abandon all coastal defenses of Florida to protect the state’s inland rivers, like the St.
Marys River. This was done because if these rivers were controlled by the U.S. Navy, the
river could serve as a highway to take Union gunboats up into Georgia and Alabama.
This withdrawal of Confederate manpower left less than 1,726 effective troops inside
Middle and Northeast Florida by the time Union gunboats began anchoring off Florida’s
east coast near Fernandina and St. Augustine on March 12, 1862. Lee’s recommendation,
combined with the military reversals at Shiloh, Forts Henry and Donelson, and the
evacuation of Nashville in the Western theatre during the Spring campaign of 1862,
caused Benjamin to withdraw many Confederate units from Florida, and ensured St.
Augustine would be left defenseless. 50
Ash contends that with the manpower drain occurring all over the South prior to
Union occupation, southerners reacted quickly, often packing up and evacuating their
town at any sign of approaching Union troops, fearful of what Union soldiers might do to
the defenseless population. After the sighting of an unidentified ship off the coast on
March 9, 1862, the city’s defenders were ordered to evacuate the town the following day.
Around thirty men accompanied by wagons left the city at ten at night while the rest of
the company evacuated in small boats. In addition to these troops, about a fifth of St.
Augustine’s southern civilians streamed out of the town rather than face the prospect of
occupied life. As an act of symbolic resistance in the face of retreat, a group of women
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chopped down the flag pole in the center of the town to prevent the U.S. flag from flying
on it. 51
Occupying St. Augustine was not originally part of the Union’s plan to subdue
Florida. But in an effort to curb blockade running in Florida, Union troops occupied
Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine. General George B. McClellan advised that
St. Augustine should be occupied along with Fernandina to prevent this illicit trade. The
Unions’ original plan was to capture Jacksonville first and use the gunboats to transfer
two regiments of infantry with light artillery up the St. Johns River to Picolata and then
turn east to march the eighteen miles to St. Augustine, capturing the city from the rear. 52
However, these elaborate plans proved unnecessary. On March 11, 1862, the U.S.
Navy ship Wabash anchored off the mouth of St. Augustine’s harbor. This ship was there
to help blockade the port without plans to occupy the town, however, after seeing a white
flag raised above Fort Marion, Commander C. R. P. Rodgers accompanied by a small
party of men, arrived at the wharves and was greeted by the acting mayor, Christobal
Bravo, along with a throng of onlookers. Once they made their way to the town hall
where the city council was convened, the formal surrender ceremony was conducted, and
St. Augustine was handed over to the Union. Once this was accomplished, Commander
Rodgers, “called upon the clergymen of the city, requesting them to reassure their people
and to confide in our kind intentions toward them,” hoping to assuage the southern fears
of Union pillage and destruction. 53
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Despite the surrender, no U.S. troops were present inside St. Augustine until
Union troops arrived in town over a week later. On March 18, 1862, a detachment of
Marines from one of Commander Rodgers’ ships landed in St. Augustine and took
control of the city. The Marines remained there until March 24 when they loaded back
onto transports and the Fourth New Hampshire’s company took over control of St.
Augustine. After the Marines departed, the mayor and city council asked Flag Officer Du
Pont to keep the Marines stationed in the town on account of their “good conduct and
discipline of troops.” This request, though graciously received, was not accepted, and
volunteer army units would be the primary occupying force in St. Augustine. The Union
forces occupying the city would remain there till the close of the war and into
Reconstruction. 54
Ash states that when Union troops first occupied towns, they sought to conduct
themselves as professionally as possible and offered bold pronouncements about
reconciliation, friendship, and promises of leaving the general population alone and
unmolested. From the moment Commander Rodgers accepted the surrender of St.
Augustine on March 11, 1862, Union forces attempted to alleviate the concerns of the
anxious southerners whose city they now occupied. The calling of the clergy and the kind
actions of the Union Marines are all examples of early attempts to win over the southern
population. Additionally, on March 20, 1862, General Thomas W. Sherman released a
circular stating to the people of East Florida that,
The troops of the United States have come amongst you to protect loyal citizens
and their property from further molestation by the creatures of a rebel and usurped
authority, and to enable you to resuscitate a Government which they have
ruthlessly endeavored to destroy. All loyal people who return to or remain at their
54
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homes in the quiet pursuit of their lawful avocations shall be protected in all their
rights within the meaning and spirit of the Constitution of the United States. The
sole desire and intention of the Government is to maintain the integrity of the
Constitution and the laws and reclaim States which have revolted from their
national allegiance to their former prosperous and happy condition. 55
These pronouncements alone were not enough to entice the great majority of
southerners to declare themselves with the Union in those areas now occupied by the
Union. In St. Augustine, Commander Rodgers commented “there are many citizens here
who are earnestly attached to the Union, a large number who are silently opposed to it,
and a still larger number who care very little about the matter.” 56 Despite all the
reassurances Rodgers made to the congregations and the good conduct of the Marines,
some citizens still loathed the presence of Union troops. Rodgers noted that there was
“much violent and pestilent feeling among the women” of St. Augustine, a sentiment that
Ash contends was common across the occupied South. For their part, the majority of St.
Augustinians would watch and wait before testing the patience of the new occupiers. 57
St. Augustine’s Confederate experience fits with Stephen V. Ash’s points about
southern towns on the eve of the Civil War. Many St. Augustinians were committed to
southern nationalism, St. Augustinians suffered economic hardships after secession, the
town was fearful of U.S. invasion, some citizens welcomed the Union soldiers, while
most civilians watched and waited. All of these experiences are described by Ash as
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prevalent in the South up to initial Union occupation. St. Augustine had many parallels to
other southern cities and suffered similarly during the coming tragic war.
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CHAPTER TWO: ASH’S MODEL IN THE EARLY OCCUPATION
PERIOD, 1862-1863
This chapter will focus on applying Stephen V. Ash’s model of occupation to St.
Augustine in the early occupation period, March 1862 to January 1863. First, this chapter
will discuss Ash’s zones of occupation. These zones were three unique worlds in the
occupied South: garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land, and the Confederate frontier. These
three zones will be applied to St. Augustine, which will illustrate how the garrisoned
town was isolated by a dangerous countryside subject to frequent Union and Confederate
raids called no-man’s-land. This resulted in the isolation of garrisoned towns leading to
economic privations. Civilian non-violent resistance led to martial law and an eventual
rise of guerrilla warfare. This resistance and the unique topography of Northeast Florida
created a region of Confederate control that was subject to occasion Union raids called
the Confederate frontier. Then, this chapter will discuss Ash’s assertions that the insults
against soldiers, persecutions of Unionists, and irregular warfare that occurred in St.
Augustine and no-man’s-land led to a change in Union war aims. This change was
spurred by frustrated and confused Union soldiers who slowly pursued harsher policies of
martial law, reprisals, the targeting of southern property, and expulsions of southern
civilians. All of this inflicted painful changes to the regions population that will be
illustrated by the sharp demographic decline of St. Augustine in the early occupation
period.
In his work When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South,
1861-1865, Stephen V. Ash called areas under direct occupation by U.S. troops
garrisoned towns. In essence, a garrisoned town was a small island of Union control in a
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sea of “Rebeldom.” 58 Garrisoned towns had many facets to their occupation experience
such as: fear of attack, defiance, martial law, inflation, supply issues, humanitarian
efforts, and prostitution all behind U.S. defenses. These defenses created safe havens for
Unionists, beacons for African American self-emancipation, and brought a level of
normality to everyday life inside the garrisoned town. Garrisoned towns contained Union
troops, usually five companies or a whole regiment in strength, with some artillery and
cavalry if lucky. These troops occupied defensible towns and forts rather than spread U.S.
troops all over the countryside, which would weaken their control and negate the impact
of their concentrated firepower. 59
Due to lurking rebel forces and civilian resistance, the garrisoned town was
surrounded by an ever changing and potentially hostile countryside. This zone, called noman’s-land, was subject to Union patrols and Confederate raids. No-man’s-land was not
static. It could expand as U.S. troops garrisoned other nearby towns extending the range
that their pickets, patrols, and foragers could penetrate. No-man’s-land could also
contract, as Union troops came under ambushes in the area or if the Union war effort
suffered a strategic setback and was forced to abandon a city. Lastly, there was the
Confederate frontier, an area at the farthest extent of Confederate authority. This zone
was farther away from garrisoned towns but still experienced Union raids, which were
rare by comparison with the intrusion felt by no-man’s-land. 60
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In the occupation’s initial stages, Union authority was decidedly weak outside of
the garrisoned town and often provisions were non-existent. Union troops often stuck
close to the town proper until pickets had ensured the area immediately outside the town
was safe from Confederate irregulars. 61 U.S. troops in St. Augustine did not dare venture
too far from Fort Marion, for fear of Confederate attack. The four companies of the
Fourth New Hampshire who had relieved the Marines at St. Augustine anxiously locked
themselves up in Fort Marion awaiting reinforcements, as it would take a few days before
the requests for reinforcements reached the commanders at Hilton Head, Fernandina, and
Jacksonville. In the meantime, troops fed starving citizens when they could, but refused
to expose themselves outside of the town to find additional supplies. It was not until April
15, 1862 that three additional companies of the Fourth New Hampshire, provisions for
sixty days, and 60,000 cartridges landed in St. Augustine, fresh from the evacuation of
Jacksonville. 62
During the interlude, some Union officers and soldiers thought the town could be
easily over run. For instance, in late March 1862 Colonel Louis Bell of the Fourth New
Hampshire Volunteers, then commandant of St. Augustine, was not even sure his two
hundred men could hold the town if attacked. Brigadier-General H. G. Wright, then
stationed at Jacksonville on March 27, 1862 denied Bell’s request for reinforcements,
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It is no doubt true that you cannot with your present strength successfully defend
the town from any attempt in force against it; and I should therefore advise that
you confine your undertakings mainly to the fort and its surroundings, leaving the
defense of the place, to some extent at least, to the inhabitants. […] This, at any
time, is all they could demand. In their present attitude, judging from your views
as to their want of loyalty, it is more than they have a right to expect. 63
Union troops early on were not willing to bet their safety on the loyalty of the
community.
Charles A. Cressy, a Union soldier in the Fourth New Hampshire, shared his
commander’s view and stated several times in his journal that there were constant rumors
of attack on the lightly defended city. For example, on April 9, 1862, Cressy records that
the all of the companies went up to the fort at nightfall with all their arms and equipment,
fearing an attack on the city. 64 Rumors of attack were not just benign fears that went
unnoticed by Union commanders and troops. Rather, these rumors and fears led to false
alarms, panicked gun fire, and stressful movements of entire companies. These
companies routinely trudged from the St. Francis Barracks on one end of town, where
many of the Fourth New Hampshire were stationed, over to Fort Marion on the other side
of town for protection against possible attacks. Other times soldiers could be woken up
by “the long roll” in the middle of the night, where they had to form lines of battle and
could wait for an attack for hours. Tensions ran high in town for good reason, as
Confederate sharpshooters took shots at Union pickets in town on one occasion. 65
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These frequent alarms, the issues arising from the defiance of southerners in town,
and the small two hundred man garrison, led Union forces to renege on their initial
statements that the inhabitants of St. Augustine would not be molested. Despite
Commander Rodgers’ assurances that municipal government would continue to function,
local government in St. Augustine under Mayor G. A. Pacetti lasted from March 25, 1862
to April 12, 1862, ending when martial law was declared. Writing to General Benham,
Colonel Bell explained he found, “a constant communication was kept up between the
inhabitants of this city and the enemy and that members of the city government would not
assist me in preventing it, I placed the city under martial law.” 66 Though Colonel Bell
reported he believed the residents wanted martial law, subsequent actions proved
otherwise. This fits with Ash’s assertions that situations like the one Bell found himself
in is similar to many Union commanders across the occupied South, as both Generals
Butler and Sherman suspended local municipal government shortly after taking
possession of New Orleans and Memphis respectively. 67
All over the occupied South, Ash claims local commanders fretted about what to
do with self-emancipated slaves, especially as the government refused to establish a firm
policy. This is true too for St. Augustine, as Colonel Bell in the same note to General
Benham, asked the decisive question that could affect the course of the Civil War. “I
have the honor to request instructions as to slaves belonging to disloyal men. I have
retained such slaves, furnishing them with food and compelling them to work, and simply
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excluding other slaves from the fort.” 68 It would be some time before concrete answers
were provided.
Martial law did not immediately put an end to non-violent civilian resistance,
especially on the part of women. In May 1862, a group of girls went to the remains of the
flagpole that was chopped down and kissed its pieces fervently in front of the U.S. troops.
When Union soldiers burned down the pole’s stump in frustration, the women came the
following day and took the remains for keepsakes. Though Union troops mocked the
display, Colonel Bell was less amused.
Certain women having conducted themselves, last evening and this morning, in a
manner grossly insulting to the United States Forces stationed here, by collecting
together in the Plaza and there openly manifesting their disloyalty to the United
States, I have ordered that hereafter any woman who shall be guilty of any open
and offensive exhibition of disloyalty, shall be considered as having forfeited
immunity from punishment by reason of her sex, and shall be held in strict arrest.
And furthermore, if any such disgraceful scene is reenacted, I shall enforce the
full vigor of Martial Law in the city.” 69
Colonel Bell, like General Butler in New Orleans, would not tolerate open defiance.
Security demanded it.
After martial law was imposed, some soldiers maintained their fear of attack
while others felt secure inside the garrisoned town. In St. Augustine, Union soldiers
became cynical of potential attacks on the city and casually brushed off rumors of large
rebel forces lurking in the area. On July 13, 1862 Leander Harris described that officers
had received reports that a party of “800 guerrillas” were in the woods surrounding the
city. This was not the first time that reports of large guerrillas forces in the area, though
68
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each report proved to be unfounded. Due to these repeated rumors, Harris claimed that he
“shall not lose any sleep on that account!” 70
The lack of skirmishes around St. Augustine in the first two months after initial
occupation, Ash claims, is not unique and in fact occurred across the occupied South.
This lack of outright violence occurred for several reasons: (1) Southerners in garrisoned
towns were afraid to openly resist Union forces for fear of rape and destruction that they
expected to be exacted on them. (2) Most of the South’s manpower was drained by
mobilization and conscription, offering few available men to fight off the U.S. Army. In
addition, white male southerners who did stay behind were often young boys, old men,
home guard units, and Unionists, none of whom would oppose the magnitude of U.S.
power being brought to bear in Northeast Florida. (3) Guerrillas reflected broader
communal morale, as civilian resistance to Union rule increased, so did guerrillas when
available manpower enabled it. 71
With garrisoned towns cut off from their surroundings due to martial law and
growing violence from Confederate irregulars, local economies were broken. St.
Augustine’s antebellum economy was directly linked to its access to the interior of
Florida. The closest access point for materials and people coming from the coast to the
interior and vice versa ran through Picolata on the east bank of the St. Johns River.
During the antebellum period, goods, slaves, and tourists floated up the St. Johns River,
disembarked at Picolata, and then had to travel overland by stage coach on bad roads for
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eighteen miles, a journey which could take over three and a half hours. 72 This connection
between St. Augustine and Picolata lasted for decades during the antebellum period and
remained intact during the first year of Confederate rule of Florida. During the period of
Confederate control, Picolata was used to ferry Florida’s state militia between Northeast
Florida and the rest of the state, continuing the town’s tradition of being the western
gateway to St. Augustine. 73
This connection between St. Augustine and Picolata came to an end with the
declaration of martial law in St. Augustine in April 1862. Garrisoned towns were at times
completely cut off from the surrounding countryside and other towns for weeks or
months at a time. This is true for the connection between Picolata and St. Augustine,
which isolated the families, communities, as well as the businesses of St. Johns County,
causing additional social and economic strain to the area. 74 Without tourists from the
North to visit the two cities and the halting of goods coming in from the interior or coast
by the Union blockade, St. Augustine and Picolata were deprived of their most lucrative
businesses. Additionally, businesses that had resided in the region for years were slowly
pushed farther and farther away from roving Union patrols originating in the Ancient
City.
Privations inside garrisoned towns multiplied under these isolated conditions. In
St. Augustine these privations can be illustrated in the writings of A. H. Young of the
Seventh New Hampshire, who observed that though some citizens in town were worth
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“thousands” they were in reality destitute as all their worth was in “Florida money,”
which resulted in nearly one third of the population being supported by Union
provisions. 75 Colonel Louis Bell of the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers requested
food shipments from captured ships off the Florida coast, because the civilians of St.
Augustine had so little food and the Fourth’s own rations were dangerously low. 76
Supplies were slow in coming due to the lack of transport vessels, the isolation of St.
Augustine, and bureaucratic wrangling between the Department of the South and the War
Department. The overall effects of waiting nearly a month to receive supplies led various
commanders to take matters into their own hands. Without orders Colonel Bell, whose
men had recently helped capture a marooned Confederate blockade-runner, distributed
food to the townspeople and his men who were all on limited rations. 77
These food shortages and supply problems led some U.S. soldiers to focus on
what they described as the “lazy” attitude of the white population of St. Augustine.
Soldiers like Corporal J. Milton Durgin and Second Lieutenant Calvin Shedd of
Company A, Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, marveled at how oranges and flowers
could grow at nearly all times of the year, which prompted Shedd to wonder why so
many local plots of land were not being utilized by the town to grow the food they
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desperately needed and begged for. 78 Some officers and their wives took it upon
themselves to make gardens while they resided in the town. Union officers kept these
small plots and the fruits of their labor were rarely shared with the men under their
command. As a result, many soldiers risked confrontation from guerrillas or hungry
civilians and simply picked the fruit of the occupied townspeople, or the groves that
resided outside the town limits, at their own peril. 79
Garrisoned towns were isolated and surrounded by a dangerous, fluid, and
unpredictable no-man’s-land. No-man’s-land varied greatly during the war based on local
campaigns, grand strategic movements, and a general fear of being surprised or
ambushed. These areas saw frequent visitations from Union troops, which viewed noman’s-land as under their control, despite its susceptibility to Confederate, partisan, or
guerrilla attacks. Garrisoned towns and no-man’s-land were by no means static or
permanent; in many cases a garrisoned town could be evacuated to reinforce other Union
garrisoned towns in the area. This would change the whole strategic outlook and expand
or contract no-man’s-land based on the distance to the next Union garrisoned town. A
good example of this happening in Northeast Florida was the evacuation of Jacksonville,
Florida, three separate times before a permanent U.S. Army presence was established in
1864. 80
In part of the early occupation period, roughly March to October 1862, no-man’sland extended six miles outside of St. Augustine in all directions. This limited extension
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is for three main reasons: (1) St. Augustine’s garrison lacked cavalry. This limited the
range of effective patrols in the area as any patrol would be by foot, through tough
undergrowth where opportunities for ambush abounded. This confined Union soldiers to
six miles distance around St. Augustine before returning to the Ancient City when not
using main roads. (2) Only a few major roads connected St. Augustine to Jacksonville to
the north, Picolata to the west, and New Smyrna to the south. These roads were rough,
lacked proper maintenance, and traversed wild terrains of palmettos, swamps, and pine
forests. Only the road to Picolata could guarantee the Union control one way for eighteen
miles. However, this required U.S. Navy gunboats to anchor off Picolata for such deep
excursions. (3) St. Augustine’s distance from the St. Johns River precluded it from being
able to engage in the successful naval raids that extended from Jacksonville and
Fernandina on the St. Johns and St. Marys River. Any transport of troops from St.
Augustine had to leave her harbor, travel north to the mouth of the St. Johns River, pass
Jacksonville and proceed up river into the Confederate frontier. From there troops could
only disembark at small docks in places like Picolata, Palatka, and Welaka. The latter two
were still under Confederate control in 1862. 81

81

On St. Augustine’s lack of cavalry see: Report of Col. Haldimond S. Putnam to Lieut. Col. Charles G.
Halpine, March 12, 1863 War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 14, 224; Report of Lieut. Col. Joseph C.
Abbott, Seventh New Hampshire Infantry to Col. H. S. Putnam, March 10, 1863, 224-225. Ash describes
the reasons why the Department of the South had so few troops, which limited the amount of forces that
could be deployed in Florida, thereby explaining why St. Augustine’s detachment lacked cavalry, see: Ash,
Firebrand of Liberty, 16-17, 74-75, 84. On descriptions of the route to St. Augustine see: Sastre, “Picolata
on the St. Johns,” 211. No historian has attempted to break Northeast Florida into zones of occupation,
George Buker came close to delineating zones of occupation, but he listed all of Northeast Florida from
Fernandina to Welaka as under Union control with a small section from Lake George to New Smyrna
labeled as “contested,” Buker, “The Inner Blockade,” 75. The delineations argued here are derived from
marching distances from St. Augustine based on testimony from U.S. soldiers. Charles A. Cressy Diary,
July 20, 1862 shows that Union troops with water and rations could scout six miles outside of the town into
no-man’s-land when avoiding roads. Sailing distances from Picolata to Welaka also affect the extent of noman’s-land, see: George Buker, “The Inner Blockade of Florida and the Wildcat Blockade-Runners.” North
& South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Society 4, no. 2 (January 2001): pp. 70-85, 75. For a map
of the zones of occupation in Northeast Florida, see Appendix A of this thesis.

44

According to Brigadier General H. W. Benham, a general in the Department of
the South, St. Augustine, as well as much of Florida, lacked any type of reliable landbased transportation. To make things worse, there were precious few gunboats and even
fewer transport and supply ships, all of which were subject to removal to another theatre
of the war. This meant that Union troops at St. Augustine were alone in covering the vast
stretch of no-man’s-land, where the only other forces available were engaged in the
occupations of Jacksonville and Picolata. As commanders would complain the entire war,
St. Augustine’s garrison did not contain a cavalry detachment, which made pursuing any
raiders from the Confederate interior nearly impossible. 82
One default in Ash’s model is he does not note how the conflicts in no-man’s-land
were complicated by natural topographic features such as mountains to hide in, or rivers
to use as highways for shuttling troops. Topography could affect the strategic situation
and this important feature is glossed over by Ash in his work. In Florida, the value of the
St. Johns River for both Union and Confederate forces in the Civil War cannot be
overstated. It served as a natural border between the Confederate frontier and no-man’sland and as a highway for Union gunboats to patrol and raid deep into Northeast Florida.
Furthermore, the land in Northeast Florida was routinely described as one big, desolate,
pine desert, which complicated overland movements by both Union and Confederate
troops. In addition, Union gunboats floated up and down the St. Marys and St. Johns
River to create an “inner blockade” on Florida’s rivers, strangling trade even further. This
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was very effective in concentrating the blockade, as ships off the coast could be blown
off their positions by the storms and rough seas of the Atlantic Ocean. 83
Throughout the conflict, both sides maneuvered to cut the river and the rest of the
state off from each other, thereby denying important resources, information, and mobility
to the enemy. In March 1862 just after the occupation of St. Augustine and Jacksonville,
both Confederate and Union forces destroyed small boats up and down the St. Johns
River in an attempt to prevent Unionists, deserters, and slaves from relaying information
to the other side. Union commander Maxwell Woodhull estimated that over one thousand
small boats were destroyed by Union forces along the St. Johns River to prevent the
movement of, or the flow of information to, guerrillas. Confederate General Joseph
Finegan wanted to achieve similar limits of information flowing to Union gunboats and
ordered all people of questionable loyalty along the east bank of the St. Johns River to ten
miles inland on the west bank of the St. Johns River for close surveillance. In October
1862, Captain J. J. Dickison was ordered to remove all slaves with absent owners and
freedmen to the west bank of the St. Johns River for similar reasons. 84
One factor Ash describes that is applicable to Northeast Florida is the plight of the
Unionists in no-man’s-land. Though many Union officers questioned the loyalty of St.
Augustinians, Unionists from all over no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida were proving
that their loyalties lay with the old flag. Information flowed between garrisoned towns
and no-man’s-land, many of the alarms and rumors given to Union troops came in from
these Unionist residents in the countryside, making them targets for Confederate
83

Buker, “The Inner Blockade,” 75-80. For descriptions of the land around St. Augustine as a “pine
desert,” see: Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon to Capt. W. L. M. Burger, May 27, 1864, War of the Rebellion,
Series I, Volume 35, Pt. I, 393-396.
84
Buker, “The Inner Blockade,” 77-78; Capt. W. Call Special Order No. 1342, October 30, 1862, War of
the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. 14, 661.

46

irregulars. Confederates recognized this problem and thought they knew how to solve it.
J. W. Pearson of the Ochlawaha Rangers stated “at least three-fourths of the people on
the St. Johns River and east of it are aiding and abetting the enemy; we could see them at
all times through the day communicating with the vessel in their small boats. It is not safe
for a small force to be on the east side of the river; there is great danger of being betrayed
into the hands of the enemy. I fear this will be no better until martial law is proclaimed
and several of them hung,” with three or four specific people in mind. Other men made
good on their threats to kill Unionists in no-man’s-land. In June 1862, “Confederate
guerrillas” hung a man outside of St. Augustine. 85
The combat leader of Confederate attempts to thwart Union control of no-man’sland on the east side of the St. Johns River was Captain J. J. Dickison, commander of
Company H in the Second Florida Cavalry, whose raids and presence would be feared
and guarded against by Union forces for the entire war. Dickison’s reputation, exploits,
and strategic influence were well known among Union forces and southern civilians
alike. Though a member of the regular army, Dickison’s Confederate cavalry employed
guerrilla-style tactics, which suited Northeast Florida’s heavily timbered countryside of
no-man’s-land where, with the small number of troops he had available, he was able to
harass Union scouts and foraging parties. 86
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The effect that irregular forces in no-man’s-land had on occupation is illustrated
in the letters of J. Milton Durgin, a corporal in the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers.
Durgin writes of the need for excessive picket patrols, “We have a great deal of Picket
Duty to perform for fear of the guerrillas, a great number of who, hover around the place
ready to enter and burn and plunder when an opportunity presents itself for them to do so
without much danger to themselves.” 87 Picket duty took soldiers to the very edges of
Union control in no-man’s-land around St. Augustine. The frequency with which pickets
shot into the darkness at any sign of movement is a testament to the strain that Union
troops were under. Andrew Hale Young, a member of Colonel H. S. Putnam’s Seventh
New Hampshire Volunteers, stated that Union lines extended less than half a mile outside
of the town proper, with Union forces essentially “contained” within St. Augustine.
Nervous Union pickets and an inability to expand pickets beyond the edges of St.
Augustine indicates the effectiveness of J. J. Dickison and his men of the Second Florida
Cavalry at inhibiting an effective Union presence in the no-man’s-land around St.
Augustine. 88
Ash discusses the extremely dangerous nature of no-man’s-land during the Civil
War. Union Regiments from St. Augustine or Jacksonville preferred to travel by water up
and down the St. Johns River rather than march overland on difficult terrain where
possible ambushes lay in wait. Captain J. J. Dickison, though not always successful in his
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attempts to disrupt Union positions, made his presence well known to Union troops in the
area and was considered a serious threat by U.S. authorities. 89 During ventures Union
troops made outside the garrisoned town on fatigue duty (the gathering of supplies,
chopping wood, etc.) soldiers fell prey to unexpected guerrilla raids from Captain
Dickison, who took small amounts of Union troops prisoner and persecuted Unionist
residents of the east bank of the St. Johns River. Residents were held and prevented from
relaying rebel movements to Union forces, and on more than one occasion, civilians were
killed for not supporting the guerrilla fighters. 90
An example of the danger of no-man’s-land can be illustrated in the summer of
1862, when guerrilla warfare became problematic for Union troops in Northeast Florida.
The New York Herald reported that, “The inhabitants [of St. Augustine] are not
privileged to go out because of bands of guerrillas who are everywhere organizing. This
has produced a reign of terror in the neighborhood. Guerrillas do not hesitate to kill those
who differ from them.” 91 This resistance drove General Benham to propose harsh
measures for those who resisted Union army rule; any irregular force that injured loyal
Unionists "contrary to the laws and usages of war shall be visited fourfold upon the
inhabitants of disloyal or doubtful character nearest the scene of any such wrongs when
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the actual and known perpetrators cannot be discovered." 92 This chaotic situation in
Northeast Florida ensured that the strategic situation would constantly be in flux.
Unionists outside of the garrisoned city of St. Augustine were still exposed, but Union
troops inside garrisoned St. Augustine, were secure from direct attack.
Under the protection of Union gunboats, Confederates could only watch as Union
troops disembarked from their trips up the St. Johns River to raid, free slaves, and protect
Unionists. As many small boats were destroyed on the St. Johns River by both sides,
crossing Confederate forces into Northeast Florida from the Confederate frontier on the
west bank became perilous, as gunboats could cut off these detachments of Confederate
irregulars from their bases. Union troops were increasingly sent out farther into noman’s-land to raid and search for guerrillas. Confederates had already ravished no-man’sland when they forced the removal of disloyal southerners into the Confederate frontier.
Now it was the turn of Confederate sympathizers in no-man’s-land’s to suffer. This
occurred when stern though liberal orders were issued from Major-General David Hunter
on June 20, 1862. These orders allowed Union forces to expel any civilians who refused
to take the oath of allegiance and to heavily iron and imprison any guerrilla that was
captured. Though General Hunter forbade the death penalty for captured guerrillas, he did
suggest the arming of African Americans and Native Americans to thwart any further
attacks against loyal civilians in and around St. Augustine. 93
On the west bank of the St. Johns River near Palatka and on the east and west
bank south of Welaka, lay the Confederate frontier. Ash claims that this zone of
occupation was occasionally subject to U.S. Army raids but rarely under sustained Union
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occupation and subject to Confederate authority. Due to the lack of manpower not just in
the Department of the South, but all over Union-occupied territory, the Union could not
hold effective control of this region of the Confederate frontier. Instead, Union forces
were held up in garrisoned towns and could only travel as far around these bastions of
Union control as their horses, ships, or legs would take them. This left an area outside of
regular Union patrols with little-to-no Union control. However, this did not prevent the
Confederate frontier from being penetrated by Union forces with enough supplies and
transportation. In Northeast Florida, this Confederate frontier followed the east and west
bank of the St. Johns River, south to Picolata and Gainesville and the Confederate interior
to the west of Palatka. 94
Any attempt to push across the St. Johns River required a strong force and reliable
transportation to achieve the objective. However, these were the two things that St.
Augustine’s garrison lacked during its early occupation. 95 Writing to Quartermaster
General M. C. Meigs Brigadier General H. W. Benham stated, “Land transportation as
horses, mules, and wagons, your department has not furnished us, and they could have
been but of limited use if you had. Our only means of movement therefore for attack or
defense is by vessels, and they must be steamers.” 96 General Benham saw the strategic
problems of the Department of the South. It was too big, had too many places to blockade
or occupy to prevent blockade-runners, and the entire department crawled with
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Confederate cavalry, partisans, and guerrillas. Only armed steamers could safely
transport men in substantial force to dissuade most attacks by Confederate irregulars who
were attempting to deny the Union control of the St. Johns River and Northeast Florida.
Town’s that bordered no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier that had once
been commercial connections between coastal cities like St. Augustine and Florida’s
interior were not spared the economic dislocation that affected garrisoned towns. For
instance, Picolata became a desolate town and by the end of the war, only two houses
remained standing out of the half dozen that had survived the Second Seminole War.
Supplies from Florida’s interior were shut off as U.S. Navy gunboats in the area guarded
against Confederate troops and supplies crossing into Northeast Florida. Though Picolata
would be periodically occupied by Union troops after the summer of 1863, its value as an
economic connection to St. Augustine ceased to exist. 97
With Picolata cut off from St. Augustine, the Ancient City’s only income came
from the meager trade between citizens in no-man’s-land, or in town with Union troops.
This trade between soldiers and civilians was easily interrupted. Supplies were scarce as a
result of the few U.S. Navy transports coming into St. Augustine, which also led to the
inconsistent pay for Union troops. In fact the payment of Union troops was so
inconsistent that months could pass without soldiers receiving compensation, further
depriving the garrisoned town of income. 98
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Ash states that as the summer of 1862 waned, attacks on Unionists, the defiance
of southerners, and the danger to U.S. troops, caused Union officers across the occupied
South to run out of patience. Local commanders had wide latitude in exercising their
authority. Generals like Benjamin Butler and William Tecumseh Sherman often
instigated policies without clear direction from Washington, based solely on their
understanding of the strategic situation and local population’s loyalty. This is another
default in Ash’s study, as he paints a oversimplified transition between conciliation and
hard war. Historian Mark Grimsley states that there was no clear transition between
conciliation, pragmatism, and hard war policies that occurred after 1863. Department
commanders, judging events on the ground, often created policies which fell between
conciliation and hard war. Military necessity, reprisals, and lack of discipline, among
other things, could influence how occupation played out locally. In the end, policies or
procedures of occupation first enacted by Union troops were often later adopted by the
U.S. government. 99
Union soldiers went through stages in their actions and adapted to their
interactions with southern civilians, ranging from conciliation to subjugation. Some
southern civilians remained defiant, even if it was not through overt military means.
However, actions towards southern civilians were never uniform and the application of
even basic orders could receive some startlingly different results. For instance, U.S.
conciliatory policy in 1862 stipulated that cooperating southerners could petition garrison
10, December 5, 6, 21, 1862; this fits with Ash’s assertions that garrisoned towns often had supply issues
and high inflation, which forced U.S. forces to care for civilians inside the town Ash, When the Yankees
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99
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commanders for the return of their slaves if the slave had fled into Union lines.
Departmental commanders did not uniformly uphold this policy. For example, Colonel
Bell of the Fourth New Hampshire was arrested in July 1862 for violating Major-General
David Hunter’s orders not to return any slaves to their masters. 100
Colonel Bell believed the charges were because of the actions of his provost
marshal, who had expelled a group of African American women after labeling them
“prostitutes.” As no owner had come forth requesting their return, the provost marshal
was also in violation of U.S. policy on returning slaves. Bell, in a letter to his wife and
later to the editor of the Independent Democrat, a newspaper in New Hampshire that
spread rumors about Bell’s conduct, claimed that he had never ordered the returning of
any slaves, only the removal of those “prostitutes” of the town who posed a danger to the
health of his men. Writing home to his wife, he explained that, “I feel easy for […] I have
tried to conscientiously do my duty towards the negroes according to my best judgment
setting them free whenever I could and making their bondage less hard when I could not
free them.” Hunter, an avid abolitionist, clearly disagreed. 101
Writing months later, A. H. Young commented on the treatment that African
Americans and white St. Augustinians received from the Fourth New Hampshire. Young
stated that “Bell is as true a man as I am” but his officers were abusive towards African
Americans. These “pro slavery officers” complained that they fought “for union and the
100
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constitution as it was” not on the question of “if they considered a negro as good as a
white man.” 102 Young then went on to describe how in one instance when Colonel Bell
was away, Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton, a commander under General Hunter, visited
the town and was “mobbed in regular southern style by soldiers who should have
protected him” because the general tried to impose loose restrictions on African
Americans’ ability to move inside St. Augustine “as they pleased.” 103
The latitude given to regiments and departmental commanders not only created
substantial inconsistencies in the ways that particular Union regiments dealt with
southern civilians and African Americans in St. Augustine, but also affected the issue of
expulsions which occurred across the occupied South. During the stay of the Fourth New
Hampshire, limited expulsions of Confederates occurred. However, these initial
deportations would be small in comparison to the large expulsions to come under the
Seventh New Hampshire. These expulsions occurred after a Unionist was murdered
outside of town in September 1862. Union forces initiated a policy of requiring southern
civilians to take the oath of allegiance or be forced outside the lines. Such a policy had
actually been in effect since June 20, 1862, when General Hunter granted Colonel Bell
liberal orders to expel anyone outside the town regardless of sex due to resistance and
rising guerrilla violence. However, these measures were never adopted under the Fourth
New Hampshire. Only with the arrival of the Seventh New Hampshire did southern
civilians with family members serving in the Confederate army find themselves deprived
of their homes and either forced into strange quarters or transported out of St. Augustine
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altogether, destined for Fernandina, Florida or Hilton Head, South Carolina. 104 Ash’s
model is also insufficient when dealing with the decision to expel Confederate
sympathizers from garrisoned towns. Ash describes expulsions as common from 1863 on,
but does not discuss them in great detail in late 1862, when they occurred in the
Department of the South. This makes St. Augustine unique and represents another flaw
with Ash’s model. 105
Many times Union troops were ahead of the administration in terms of
implementing policy on the ground. This was true of Union soldiers in St. Augustine who
with General Hunter’s blessing, had early on abandoned conciliation for “hard war.”106
Hard war, a term first adopted by historian Bruce Catton, is a specific form of warfare
that strategically targets not just military personnel and material, but also civilian
property thereby denying materials for the enemy army. Historian Mark Grimsley
popularized the term hard war in his work on Union military policy and distinguished it
104
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from “total war.” Citing historian Mark E. Neely, Jr.’s work on “total war” in the Civil
War, Grimsley agreed with Neely’s assertion that the Civil War was not a total war
because, “the essential aspect of any definition of total war asserts that it breaks down the
distinction between soldiers and civilians, combatants and noncombatants, and this no
one in the Civil War did systemically, including William T. Sherman.” 107 Though the
Civil War was not a total war with indiscriminate killing and plundering, Union forces
after 1863 dropped the policy commonly known as conciliation. This policy respected
loyal southerners’ property, in the hopes of maintaining the loyalty of the border slave
states. 108
In 1862, conciliation was still Union policy, but several episodes in the occupied
South show that soldiers simply conducted reprisals when threatened and attacked. For
example, Charles A. Cressy in the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers described how the
men of his regiment destroyed property often frequented by guerrillas. After being called
out on the “long roll” because of an alarm, the regiment went inside Fort Marion and
shelled the woods and fields surrounding the city. Afterwards, two companies went out
three miles from St. Augustine to the Fairbanks house and discovered horses that had
been left behind by the Confederate irregular troops. As a consequence of this, troops
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from another company in the Fourth New Hampshire marched out of St. Augustine the
following day and tore down the Fairbanks house and then took whatever goods and
furniture they could carry away. 109
These actions on July 17-18, 1862 preceded any official War Department policy
that advocated the targeting of southern property. However, these actions came on the
heels of General Hunter’s orders concerning goods, slaves, and civilians in the
Department of the South issued on June 20, 1862. 110 These Union soldiers were
frustrated by months of garrison duty, false alarms, and harassment by guerrillas. In
response to these stresses, U.S. soldiers took it upon themselves to tear down the
Fairbanks house and plunder the goods inside. This reprisal was not solely done out of
revenge but also to remove any shelter or point of organization for Confederate guerrillas
operating on the east bank of the St. John’s River. 111 Unfortunately, no records survive of
the action in the official records, which explains why previous authors have not recorded
this early example of reprisals by frustrated Union troops. Calvin Shedd from the Seventh
New Hampshire Volunteers corroborates the story. In a letter to his wife, Shedd
described a skirmish in the vicinity of St. Augustine and mentions “the remains of the
Fairbanks house,” which “our soldiers”—meaning soldiers from the Fourth New
Hampshire—“had burnt.” 112
As occupation progressed, this defiance held consequences for men and women in
the town. Defiance and opposition to taking the oath of allegiance led to the expulsions of
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hundreds of men, women, and children from the town. In addition, wide latitude could
also bring about inconsistency in actions towards southern civilians. On October 12-16,
1862, Calvin Shedd outlined what he felt were some of the differences between the
relations of the citizens with the Fourth and Seventh New Hampshire,
The Citizens liked the 4th first rate for they used to abuse the Niggers & let the
whites do just as they pleased, let them pass out in the lines pretty much as they
liked when the 7th came here everything is changed Abbot & Put(nam) just made
the Men & Women take the Oath of Allegiance or go outside the Lines, it made
an awfull Growl, but it was no use they had to take it, quite a number of the
women had to go, their Husbands being in the Rebel Army they were Rebel too &
had to leave. I dont think there is a real hearty Union man in Town, they take the
oath for convenience sake, so they can stay at home. 113
With the departure of the Fourth New Hampshire from St. Augustine in September 1862,
the Seventh New Hampshire took over occupation duty of the Ancient City. Colonel
Haldimand S. Putnam, learning from the example General Hunter made of Putnam’s
predecessor Colonel Bell, and frustrated by continued resistance, implemented Hunter’s
harsher policy that required the population to take the oath of allegiance or be forcibly
expelled. 114
When orders arrived in town from Hilton Head, the town’s population, age
fourteen and up, was crowded into the Presbyterian Church for the purposes of signing
the oath of allegiance. Once there the assembled was addressed by a member of the
provost guard, "I do not know whether to address you (alluding to the ladies present), as
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ladies or women, as all Broadway crinolined women are called ladies!" 115 After
announcing the purpose of the meeting and collecting the signatures of those who took
the oath, the remaining southern civilians were registered as disloyal and told to prepare
for “a free ride” into rebeldom. This expulsion had come at the behest of General Rufus
Saxton, acting commander while General Hunter was being relieved. 116
Several hundred women and children were transported out of St. Augustine in
mid-September 1862, and A. H. Young described his return from guarding a group of
them onboard the steamer Burnside bound for Hilton Head. Young was detailed to
accompany the refugees who had dubbed the event the “anti-loyal female expedition to
St. Johns River.” Young told “the wealthy people of St. Augustine” who were all “of
course indignant” that he was detailed to them because of his good looks and on the
account of his blood that came from “one of the finest families in the north” and he
would “compensate for the badness of the ship.” 117 His efforts appeared to have returned
the “good nature” of the ladies onboard, though he then admits that he should have just
saved his breath since soon thereafter, all of the refugees succumbed to seasickness,
destroying their remaining “good nature.” 118 Young joked “I am happy to say that about
all the best looking girls remained […] I will write more about this. Some of the scenes
were very comical.” 119
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News of the expulsions was reported in southern newspapers like the Charleston
Mercury, which described the deportations of families from St. Augustine. The paper
reports that “The steamer left for the St. John's River with some fifty families--about 150
women and children huddled together, without a bed to rest on, or any accommodations
whatever, and kept two and a half days outside without food or water save what they took
with them, and in their sea sickness were refused even water to drink.” 120
These expulsions by Union forces were conducted with little to no warning to the
citizens of St. Augustine; from martial law being declared under the Fourth New
Hampshire Volunteers to forced deportations under the Seventh New Hampshire
Volunteers, these wartime measures shattered the antebellum community as Ash
describes in his work. During a very short time period, Shedd and other officers estimated
that Union forces removed around three hundred people from the town and transported to
places like Fernandina or Hilton Head. No records detailing the remaining population in
December 1862 exist. Only the letters of Sam Walcott, a company clerk for the Seventh
Connecticut, provide an estimation of the town’s remaining population at around 700
whites and 300 African Americans in mid-1863. Both Confederate and Union troops
were displacing hundreds of civilians, and while it is not yet clear what became of all
these refugees, several military records and correspondence indicate that some St.
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Augustinians tried to return to their city, even crossing through the dangerous and
desolate wasteland of no-man’s-land to do so. 121
This chapter has shown that Ash’s model of occupation works for St. Augustine
during the early period. St. Augustine was a garrisoned town, surrounded by a violent and
menacing no-man’s-land where irregular forces persecuted Unionists and frustrated
Union troops. This no-man’s-land ran up to the St. Johns River by 1863 and was
bordered by the Confederate frontier which stretched from the western side of the St.
Johns River to Florida’s interior. In St. Augustine, as with the rest of the occupied South,
both violent and non-violent resistance led to frustration and conflict, which shaped the
progression of occupation in garrisoned towns, resulting in the gradual abandonment of
the conciliatory policy for hard war. Defiance, once greeted with bemusement, eventually
was greeted with arrests and forced expulsions of Confederate families, sympathizers,
and those who the Union army no longer cared to feed. Lastly, these events of occupation
shattered the antebellum community, leading to demographic change with the expulsions
of white southerners and the influx of African American and white refugees. This all
applies to the garrisoned town of St. Augustine where defiance resulted in expulsions and
the driving out of over three hundred white residents, significantly changing the city from
its antebellum condition.
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CHAPTER THREE: ASH’S OCCUPATION MODEL IN THE LATE
OCCUPATION PEROD, 1863-1865
This chapter will briefly discuss St. Augustine’s condition at the start of 1863.
This will highlight the changes to St. Augustine in its first year under Union control by
illustrating the physical scars that occupation left on the town. Then this chapter will
discuss Ash’s zones of occupation in the late period by covering the changes and
expansion of no-man’s-land around St. Augustine because of the inner blockade. Next,
this chapter will show that Ash’s assertions that Confederate irregulars’ harassment of
Union patrols and persecution of Unionists in no-man’s-land increased after 1863 applies
to the countryside surrounding St. Augustine. Then this chapter will discuss how
garrisoned towns served as beacons of freedom for African Americans and as a result
were targeted by Confederate generals, though the unique topography of Northeast
Florida prevented large-scale assaults. Though major assaults would never be adopted,
continued guerrilla war would rage in no-man’s-land and on the St. Johns River. These
attacks resulted in further expansions of no-man’s-land as Union soldiers spread out
across Northeast Florida in an attempt to protect Unionists. Lastly, this chapter will detail
the strength of Union control, the breakdown of Confederate resistance, and will
highlight the changes to the antebellum community that Ash describes from mid-1863 to
the end of the war, evidenced in a massive demographic shift.
Ash contends that garrisoned towns across the occupied South, like St. Augustine
at the start of 1863, were a shell of their former selves. Many businesses were closed,
food was short, roads in disrepair, and the population was significantly smaller. In
January 1863, citing concerns over short supplies and the fact that white southern
families had relatives in the rebel army, Union forces again evicted a large number of
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people from the town. The expulsions that took place in 1863 appear to have been
conducted in a more orderly fashion than the September 1862 expulsion. However, they
were still shocking and traumatic for white southerners. One unwelcomed shock for
white southerners was both black and white troops guarding the transports that took these
women to Fernandina and elsewhere, which was viewed as an insult by southern
refugees. Second Lieutenant Calvin Shedd of Company A, Seventh New Hampshire
Volunteers, described the lamentations of the women in town and their remonstrance at
being forced out. Even with the scenes of heartbreak at families being forced from their
homes, Shedd stated “the Women have been awfull bitter on us & I dont pity them,”
despite the fact that they would be thrust “out in Rebeldom where it is morraly certain
they will suffer for food & clothing. but the sin & blame lays at the Doors of Rebels not
us; as they sow they & their Families must reap. & the crop of Misery will be extremely
large while Death is knocking at every door.” 122 Many of these women verbally lashed
out at abolitionist Union officers, who chided the women on the journey. After the
expulsion, the number of whites in town numbered around 700 people, with 300 African
Americans as well. By mid-1863, the population of St. Augustine was estimated at 400 to
500 civilians as compared to 1,914 citizens that resided there in 1860. 123
Valentine Chamberlain of the Seventh Connecticut Volunteers upon visiting St.
Augustine in February 1863 stated “the glory of this town has departed. The streets are
desolate, the inhabitants of secesh proclivity [?] have been recently sent away. The same
day that we arrived about 80 left— more than half however were children. Some have left
since. The first lot were set over the lines from here. The men are mostly off in the rebel
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army.” 124 Union soldiers were more or less responsible for the damage done inside the
garrisoned city. In late February 1863, Calvin Shedd reported that soldiers broke into
sutler shops, vandalized the stores, and stole over one hundred dollars’ worth of
merchandise. 125
Though St. Augustine obviously bore the scares of occupation, the town was not
completed destroyed or pillaged. Sam Walcott of the Seventh Connecticut found a great
many “bananas & a few date trees and the woods all about is full of the sour or wild
oranges.” Valentine Chamberlain managed to find a good supply of lettuce and peas in
town. Both soldiers confirm that the growing season helped alleviate some of the supply
issues inside the garrisoned town. 126 As occupation settled, despite the expulsions of
citizens and the damage done by soldiers, the garrisoned city found some semblance of
order and balance that only the Union army could ensure. Sam Walcott remarked that the
Catholic cathedral chimed its bells and held service every day. This shows that St.
Augustine suffered less destruction than what Ash described in other garrisoned towns.
However, on the whole, garrisoned towns were damaged far less than no-man’s-land, and
churches were only able to operate on a regular basis inside garrisoned towns.127
By the beginning of 1863, the relationship between garrisoned towns, no-man’sland, and the Confederate frontier had changed. The St. Johns River was under an “inner
blockade” by Union gunboats off Mayport Mills and Union steamers regularly traveled
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up to Palatka, Welaka, and beyond in the hunt for blockade-runners. In addition, Union
units travelled greater distances from St. Augustine out beyond the pickets for firewood
because foragers had consumed all the lumber surrounding the city. This task became
more dangerous as the expulsions that occurred across the occupied South were often
followed by threats of retaliation from Confederate and irregular forces. This is also true
for St. Augustine, where the expulsions of defiant St. Augustinians by Union forces
elicited a response from Confederate forces, who began to cross the St. John’s River in
force and increase attacks because their families were now gone. 128
George Buker in his work on the Union’s inner blockade argued that St.
Augustine’s quiet occupation experience was due to the blockade of St. Johns River. He
contends that these gunboats made Confederate irregulars cautious about crossing onto
the east bank of the river for fear of being cut off from their bases. However, St.
Augustine was by no means quiet and despite the Union’s gunboats, no-man’s-land
would continue to be dangerous for Union soldiers and Unionists. With many southern
families no longer in St. Augustine, guerrillas were free to harass Union troops at will.
Traveling outside of a garrisoned town during the late occupation period was dangerous
without large well-armed parties, as many soldiers around St. Augustine would soon find
out. In early January 1863, three men, including a lieutenant, were captured less than ten
miles outside of town by Confederate cavalry.
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Of course, it was not just U.S. soldiers who had to fear attack from Confederate
irregulars. The violence of Confederate irregulars against Unionists or those Floridians
who did not directly aid the Confederate cause is evidenced in the writings of Calvin
Shedd. Shedd reported that a man came over the lines on February 8, 1863, and told the
soldiers of the Seventh New Hampshire that guerrillas had come to his house, robbed him
of over a hundred dollars, and murdered his son who refused to go with them. 130 Shedd
lamented that Union soldiers could not give protection to those neutral civilians out in noman’s-land, who were subjected to the deprivations of Confederate guerrillas. “I wish we
might just get hold of them [Confederates] for a few minutes.” Even better in Shedd’s
opinion would be if the rebels actually attacked the city, so they could get “a taste of [the]
old fort.” 131
The debacle that befell the Seventh New Hampshire in March 1863 is another
example of the danger that no-man’s-land contained. On March 11-15, 1863 Calvin
Shedd described a great “excitement” around St. Augustine. According to the statements
of Colonel Putnam and Lieutenant Colonel Abbot in the Official Records of the War of
the Rebellion, Captain Dickison and around eighty of his men attacked the advanced
picket of the Seventh New Hampshire two miles outside of town. In response Colonel
Putnam sent out Lieut. Col. Abbott with over 120 men to attack Dickison’s camp.
Abbott’s attack was discovered before they could reach the Confederate camp and the
Dickison’s men retired under the cover of scattered fire from their rear guard. Again we
see the importance of cavalry here for the security of foragers leaving garrisoned towns
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into no-man’s-land. St. Augustine for much of its occupation lacked any cavalry. This
limited the effective control that Union forces could have in no-man’s-land. More
important, as Dickison’s men were mounted, Lieut. Col. Abbott was not able to
effectively pursue. The whole affair led to the capture of one Union sergeant and four
enlisted men. 132
Despite the dangers that existed in no-man’s-land, garrisoned towns could be
places of limited normality. The Seventh Connecticut and Forty-Eighth New York had
passed their time in St. Augustine relatively quietly, with the occasional raid on rebel
cattle breaking the peace. Charles Briggs, a surgeon in the convalescent hospital at St.
Augustine partook in nightly social events with pretty young ladies, lived in a wellfurnished house, and ate fine food at the Magnolia House. 133 The start of the TwentyFourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut’s time in St. Augustine followed this
pattern. However, normality did not mean that the town was prosperous. The regimental
history of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts states that barely 500 people were present in
St. Augustine during 1863, and they were almost entirely dependent on the U.S.
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government for rations. Major Dudley W. Strickland of the Forty-Eighth New York
confirmed this in his correspondence, stating that until the growing season started, little
food stuffs could be produced, as well as there were no stores in town were provisions
could be bought. He added copious notes detailing the feeding of the destitute
population. 134
Garrisoned towns were often too strong to be attacked directly by irregular forces,
but with their presence as beacons for African American self-emancipation, many
Confederates realized that something had to be done to prevent the drain of manpower
from no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier to garrisoned towns. Confederate
generals like P. G. T. Beauregard, commander of the Confederate Department of South
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, inquired about assaults on St. Augustine and Fernandina.
Confederate generals in the area, including General Joseph Finegan, commander of the
Department of East Florida, recognized the strengths of the garrisoned towns, but also
their vulnerability given the long distances between garrisons and the lack of viable
transportation necessary for quickly massing men to defend against an assault. These
Confederate generals also recognized that St. Augustine and Fernandina served as what
Beauregard’s chief of staff Thomas Jordan described as “abolition garrisons,” or places
that were sapping the strength of the Confederate war effort by enticing slaves to run
away and seek protection from U.S. forces. Ash states how Confederates attempted to
curb black freedom by trying to isolate these garrisoned towns as much as possible. 135
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From the outset of the war, Confederate forces had struggled to maintain a
presence on the east bank of the St. Johns River to disrupt Union foraging parties into noman’s-land and the Confederate frontier, to capture runaway slaves, and to prevent
southern Unionists from aiding U.S. forces. Though J. J. Dickison’s cavalry was
specifically deployed for this purpose and was effective in reducing these activities, his
forces were insufficient for general assaults against garrisoned cities. However, with
larger forces, generals like Beauregard contemplated the possibility of destroying the
“abolition garrisons.” Responding on July 28, 1864, General Joseph Finegan informed
chief of staff Jordan and General Beauregard of the inadvisability of direct assaults
against St. Augustine and Fernandina. Such an attack was possible, but highly
unadvisable, claimed Finegan. Not only did he lack the heavy siege guns necessary to
attack Fort Marion, but also,
the possession of Saint Augustine would be entirely useless to us so long as the
enemy holds the Saint Johns River, by which he is able to cut off all
communication that that town, except from a point so far south as to render the
supplying of a garrison there next to impracticable. 136
Transportation through Northeast Florida, which was described as “one great pine forest”
was difficult for both Union and Confederate forces.
Ash’s model is both applicable and flawed when applied to this situation. Ash’s
model is instructive, as it helps illustrate that zones of occupation were never uniform and
were always subject to the amount of cavalry or river transportation available and how
arduous it was to transverse the surrounding environment, i.e. rivers, swamps, or pine
forests. With Union forces in virtual command of the St. Johns River, protracted exposure
of large land forces in Northeast Florida would become untenable and a waste of
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Confederate resources. This makes St. Augustine break with Ash’s larger model for two
reasons. Ash does not detail major attempts to retake garrisoned cities by direct assault
and instead focuses on the irregular warfare that permeated the occupied South. The role
that topography, specifically the St. Johns River, played in major role in discouraging
Confederate assaults against garrisoned towns, which is unique to Northeast Florida. This
desire to destroy the Union’s hold on a specific garrisoned town, St. Augustine, is not
entirely unique, as Confederates desired to retake Nashville in 1864. 137
With the proposed attack on St. Augustine rejected by General Finegan, St.
Augustine continued to enjoy its peaceful respite from war. Like most cities in the
occupied South, the local commander was engulfed in administrative paper work for the
day to day running of the town. The commander of the post, Colonel Osborn, spent more
time going over purchases and ration quotas, saying, “I seem to have set up a retail
grocery store without any profits.” 138 In addition to this large amount of paperwork,
residents trying to make his acquaintance, or asking to go outside the lines or bring in a
relative from outside, or requesting for their property or his protection regularly
interrupted the Colonel. Union troops did not stay idle for long; soldiers partook in the
occasional raid into the no-man’s-land around St. Augustine, like one on November 9,
1863, which returned with twenty-five head of cattle, soothing the hunger of the soldiers
in town with ample roast beef. 139
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Union troops would have to go farther and farther into no-man’s-land from
garrisoned St. Augustine to obtain supplies and firewood. This exposed foraging parties
to possible attacks from Dickison’s cavalry. Thanksgiving and Christmas passed without
signs of attack and Union troops and Unionist civilians enjoyed splendid celebrations
with festivities and food that was enjoyed by all. 140 However, 1863 would end in tragedy
for the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut. On December 30, 1863 a
party of woodchoppers about two miles outside of St. Augustine in no-man’s-land were
attacked by Dickison’s cavalry, with twenty four men captured and several others killed
by the Confederates. 141
The lack of cavalry and the inability to penetrate deep into no-man’s-land and the
Confederate frontier in the first years of occupation, continued throughout the war,
further exacerbating the strategic situation of Northeast Florida. As Colonel Francis A.
Osborn of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts stated on January 1, 1864, “If I had a
company of cavalry, I am confident I could have overtaken them [Confederate
irregulars], and not only have rescued my own men, but also have captured some besides,
for from their trail they were mounted on small horses.” 142 This became especially
problematic when Union forces began occupying Picolata and Palatka, which created
more garrisoned towns capable of projecting effective Union control, spreading noman’s-land across Northeast Florida. This again illustrates the fluidity of no-man’s-land,
which saw both U.S. and Confederate raids during the late occupation period. While the
Confederate frontier on the west side of the St. Johns River only received cursory raids
140
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during 1863, Union encroachment would grow as more and more forces were transported
to Florida for the greatest concentration of troops and the largest battle Florida would see
in the Civil War.
As Union soldiers concentrated in Jacksonville and Baldwin, and Confederate
forces concentrated west of Lake City in the weeks leading up to the Battle of Olustee, St.
Augustine’s garrison was used to further disrupt beef supplies and put Confederate troops
on guard, in hopes of keeping them disoriented as to the direction of the Unions’ main
invasion route into Middle Florida. On February 7, 1864, 200 men from the TwentyFourth Massachusetts left St. Augustine and crossed the St. Johns River. They returned to
the Ancient City with two rebel soldiers, a civilian who had sugar for Dickison’s cavalry,
and forty-five head of cattle. This was the last major raid conducted by the TwentyFourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut during their stay in St. Augustine. The
majority of both regiments was transferred to Baldwin and Jacksonville and would join
the rest of the army there as it prepared to move towards Lake City and the Confederate
interior. 143
This raid also illustrates the problems caused by Union soldiers pillaging farms
and homes in no-man’s-land during cattle raids. In this instance, the officer in charge of
the raid paid farmers for the produce taken by his soldiers. Even at this stage in the war,
some Union officers were conciliatory to southern civilians. This stands in stark contrast
to the depredations that officers of the Fourth and Seventh New Hampshire allowed
during their time around St. Augustine early in the war, when official Union policy was
against such acts of aggression on civilian property. Ash mentions that some northerners
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debated the constitutionality of a hard policy, but he never states that some officers or
soldiers did not engage in hard war even after 1864. 144
After the U.S. debacle at Olustee on February 20, 1864, Union forces retreated
from their advanced positions back to the safety of the garrisoned towns of Jacksonville,
Fernandina, and St. Augustine. Though Confederate forces had stopped Union forces
from holding a permanent stronghold on the west bank of the St. Johns River, they failed
to follow up their victory, allowing U.S. soldiers to further regroup and entrench in their
garrisoned towns. Both Union and Confederate troops poured into Florida during the late
days of February and early March with around 10,000 Union troops stationed in the
Florida in the weeks after the battle. 145 Despite the relatively large Union Army in
Florida, St. Augustine, which was left with only two companies during the Olustee
campaign, was still too weak to project Union power into the Confederate frontier and
beyond.
Ash discusses at length how Unionists were the most susceptible during periods
of time in which large concentrations of Union and Confederate forces remained miles
apart. This distance did not stop Confederate irregulars and Union troops from laying
waste to no-man’s-land in between them. One such instance of this appears on April 26,
1864, when a force of 400 Confederate cavalry crossed onto the east side of the St. Johns
River for the purpose of arresting the local Union men and to confiscate all their horses,
cattle, and provisions. Thirty Unionists attempted to flee for St. Augustine, but seventeen
were caught and summarily hanged on the spot. This blatant war crime enraged U.S.
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officials, who immediately began organizing regular patrols in force from Jacksonville to
Picolata, with a substantial portion of St. Augustine’s garrison participating in these
sweeps. 146
As a result, Union forces fanned out across no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida
until the end of the war. The Seventeenth Connecticut during this time guarded St.
Augustine, while the Seventy-Fifth Ohio Volunteers, the First South Carolina, the ThirtyFifth Colored Infantry and other units, patrolled Northeast Florida. This dispersal’s goal
was to spread Union protection across Northeast Florida, in an attempt to stop
Confederate cavalry and irregulars from harassing the Unionist population. Union troops
set out routinely from Jacksonville and St. Augustine towards Palatka, Picolata, and other
garrisoned towns on the St. Johns River. Union troops, both black and white, worked in
close concert with each other, relying on their comrades to guard their flanks and rear as
Union forces tried to thwart any Confederate movements in the area.
Another consequence of the actions of Confederate irregulars, Union troops
planned a raid into the Confederate frontier in response to Captain Dickison’s efforts to
clear all the area in front of St. Augustine of Unionists. 147 This was one of the deepest
raids into the Confederate frontier and originated near St. Augustine. On April 26, 1864,
General William Birney and the men of the First South Carolina Infantry, the Thirty-Fifth
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Colored Infantry, and the One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth New York Mounted Infantry,
boarded the U.S. steamers Mary Benton and Harriet Weed at Picolata near St. Augustine.
With them was the U.S. gunboat Ottawa as protection and the expedition travelled down
the St. Johns River all the way to Welaka, Florida. Once there, the troops confiscated
molasses, freed slaves, burned cotton, requisitioned cattle, and protected Unionists, many
of whom joined their ranks as scouts. Using the freed slaves as cattle drivers led by
Unionist scouts, two to three droves of cattle, about 1,000 total, with a number of horses
were sent just north of St. Augustine to graze in between there and Jacksonville. 148
Confederates did not allow U.S. troops to operate uninhibited in no-man’s-land.
The most powerful way to deny them dominance in this area was to take the fight to the
river itself. Tired of the power of Union gunboats which prevented larger incursions into
no-man’s-land, Confederates began lining the St. Johns River south of Jacksonville with
“torpedoes,” or modern day naval mines chained to the floor of the river underneath the
water’s surface. These deadly devices had an almost immediately impact. In less than two
months, three Union ships were destroyed on the river with dozens dead, wounded, and
captured. 149
Captain Dickison had another surprise in store for U.S. Navy gunboats, which had
travelled the St. Johns River almost unmolested for the entire war—cannons. In May
1864, south of Palatka, Dickison and his men waited for the U.S. gunboat Columbine to
pass by. Taking aim with their field pieces, the Confederates opened fire, destroying the
propeller and raking the deck with grapeshot. After several minutes of effective fire, the
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gunboat struck its colors, with a total loss of twenty dead and sixty-five wounded. 150
Despite these few successes, the Confederate frontier would continue to be raided and noman’s-land in Northeast Florida was coming under tighter and tighter Union control.
As the war dragged on, Ash states that Union control increased as Confederate
control broke down. An indication of the strength of Union control in 1864 can be seen in
the writings of John C. Gray, Jr., who stated “the people of the east side of the St. Johns
are called Florida Yankees and the majority of them are Union men.” 151 Confederates
recognized this issue, noting that it caused them many problems concerning military
intelligence. Confederate Major General Patton Anderson was discouraged by the fact
that once Union troops crossed into Northeast Florida, he was completely unable to
account for their movements to reinforce either Jacksonville or St. Augustine. The noman’s-land between Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and Picolata was “wholly within the
enemy’s possession and […] it was impossible to keep ourselves well advised of all his
movements on that side of the river.” 152
Confederate resistance was breaking down in Northeast Florida and Confederate
ability to raid around St. Augustine was significantly curtailed. Union commanders were
so confident of their security that they began contemplating moving their heavy artillery
out of Fort Marion in St. Augustine to Jacksonville or Palatka, “as St. Augustine cannot
be approached by any force except small squads of cavalry.” 153 With this security, St.
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Augustine began exporting beef that was gathered in no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida
for the purpose of feeding the rest of the Department of the South. 154
Despite the extension of Union troops into no-man’s-land, Captain Dickison
continued to harass Union troops on the east bank of the St. Johns River. Justus M.
Silliman, a soldier in the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers who served in St.
Augustine, Jacksonville, and Volusia, Florida, detailed how his regiment was spread out
across Northeast Florida, leaving it open to attack from Dickison’s cavalry. This is also
unique to St. Augustine, as Ash states that it was uncommon for Union troops to spread
out over large geographic areas. 155
Despite these sweeps of Union forces, Confederate cavalry still managed to cross
to the east side of the St. Johns River and wreak havoc wherever they went. Even though
officers knew of the danger of leaving a garrisoned town unescorted, such risks became
more and more frequent as Union forces attempted to control all of Northeast Florida.
However, this net of Union troops may have led some officers to become too relaxed and
careless as many Union officers attended dances and socials outside the lines with
growing frequency. Security was becoming so lax, that even Colonel William H. Noble
of the Seventeenth Connecticut was captured by rebel forces while on a carriage ride on
the Jacksonville Road; Noble was accompanied only by one other unarmed officer and a
few ladies. 156

154

Lieut. Col. M. R. Morgan to Israel R. Sealy, April 4, 1864, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 35,
Pt. 2, 35.
155
Justus Mitchell Silliman, A New Canaan Private in the Civil War: Letters of Justus M. Silliman, 17th
Connecticut Volunteers. (New Canaan: New Canaan Historical Society, 1984): 71-73; Ash, When the
Yankees Came, 77, 92.
156
Little, The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of Rebellion, 215-217; Silliman, A
New Canaan Private in the Civil War, 90; Graham, “The Home Front,” 41.

78

Ash argues that by this time civilian resistance was dropping precipitously and
war weariness was taking effect. In late 1863, Union soldiers and government agents
reported the many of the South’s population were tired of the war and eager to rejoin the
Union. Seeking to begin a process of reconciliation, Abraham Lincoln issued the
Amnesty and Reconstruction proclamation on December 8, 1863. This allowed states that
had joined the Confederacy to re-enter the Union, if ten percent of the state’s 1860 voting
population would take the oath of allegiance. Led to believe that loyal citizens in
southern states could easily match this quota, politicians quickly used the wellintentioned act to fulfill their own designs. One such man who used these reports of
widespread demoralization was the head of the Florida Direct Tax Commission Lyman
Stickney. Stickney convinced Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase to begin
attempts to create a new state government. Seeking to challenge Lincoln in the coming
election, Chase sent Stickney to Northeast Florida to gauge the feasibility of organizing a
state government. 157
On December 19, 1863, a Unionist meeting in St. Augustine put forward a series
of resolutions that repudiated the rebellion and called for a process to readmit Florida as a
state. As part of this process, Stickney began a sale of homes belonging to Confederate
families for delinquent taxes on December 21, 1863. The sales were moderately
successful, occurring over a week, and raised $19,329 in cash. These sales were also
deemed illegal by other members of the Florida Direct Sales Tax Commission for not
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publicizing them and for not waiting the required period of time, as well as for the
number of corrupt agents who purchased real estate for themselves in town. Stickney
himself bought a lot in St. Augustine and began fixing it up while other commissioners
purchased a lot for Lincoln’s secretary, John Hay. 158
As the Union presence in Northeast Florida increased with the efforts to organize
the state, officials and business interests in St. Augustine began showcasing themselves
as model examples of pro-Union feeling. The Emancipation Proclamation celebration
was one such showcase; with bands, banners, speeches, and meals attended by whites and
freed slaves alike. But such displays could not prevent the recognition of the political
reality. John Hay, Lincoln’s secretary, travelled through Northeast Florida with the goal
of obtaining 1,100 signatures required to establish ten percent of the loyal population. In
St. Augustine alone, Hay and others managed to collect 446 signatures. However, Hay’s
efforts ended when Confederate General Joseph Finegan turned back Union General
Thomas Seymour‘s army at Olustee on February 20, 1864. 159
As part of the move to organize Florida into a loyal state, a thorough count of
occupied East Florida’s population was taken by Union authorities in early 1864. The
federal military census of 1864 shows the massive population displacement that occurred
during the Civil War in St. Augustine. The 1,914 residents of St. Augustine registered in
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the U.S. census of 1860 declined to 1,436 in 1864, a twenty-five percent drop. In
addition, of the 1,436 individuals recorded in the census, 996 were listed as original
residents of St. Augustine or forty-eight percent of the original population. 160
Tracing the origins of many of the newcomers is difficult due to the incomplete
records, but what can be discerned is that twenty-three northerners moved to St.
Augustine between 1862-1864 from New York, Vermont, Rhode Island, and New Jersey.
509 people on the census are listed as contrabands, this was the term written down for
any black individual. That leaves 927 residents who are presumably regarded as white.
Only 655 white civilians are listed as original residents of the town, far below the 1,175
listed in the census of 1860, or forty-five percent of the original white population. Out of
the 509 African Americans, 341 were listed as original residents. The census data makes
clear that the number of African Americans who lived in St. Augustine in 1860 dropped
from 739 individuals to 341 by 1864, a fifty-four percent drop. Out of the original
residents of the town, whites were in the majority with fifty-one percent of the native
population. Ash notes that whole communities were altered as many of the original
inhabitants fled, were expelled, or were absent in Confederate service. 161
The twenty-five percent drop in the town’s total population is startling alone, but
it pales in comparison to the forty-eight percent population drop of original residents of
the town. Additionally, white original residents of the town fell by roughly forty-five
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percent while African Americans fell by fifty-four percent. This drop in the town’s
population can be corroborated by the testimony of soldiers like Calvin Shedd and A. H.
Young of the Seventh New Hampshire, Sam Walcott, and news correspondents who
witnessed the series of expulsions beginning in September 1862. What can explain this
massive demographic change to St. Augustine? Firstly, the town’s population contributed
ninety-nine individuals to the St. Augustine Blues, Company B, Third Florida Infantry. In
addition, many wealthy St. Augustinians began leaving the city during the economic
slump in the months leading up to the occupation. Union soldiers Shedd and Young
recorded in their letters the forced expulsions of a number of St. Augustinians during the
summer of 1862 and throughout 1863. Though a number did return, many did not due to
selling off of their possessions or the hardships of travelling vast distances across noman’s-land. Lastly, many African Americans in East Florida joined the Union army and
many of these recruits came from St. Augustine. 162
The incomplete information unfortunately leaves us with a fragmentary picture of
the city’s African American population and arrival of refugees. For instance, 464 of the
509 African Americans are listed with their slave-master’s names recorded in another
column. Another fragmentary list shows 432 people residing in St. Augustine who are not
listed as original residents of the city. Despite this large number of people, the
fragmentary nature of the sources states that only 352 people or thirty-five percent of the
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total population in St. Augustine have the date that they arrived in the Ancient City
recorded from 1862 to 1864. 163
The 1864 census details the amount of rations given out to the residents and
refugees in St. Augustine. In May 1863, eighty-five white and sixty-seven black families
were on government aid after fourteen months. Furthermore, historian Tracy J. Revels in
her work on Florida women during the Civil War, places the total number of people
receiving rations at 321, with an estimated total cost of $35,000 for the entire period. 164
Historian J. Britt McCarley in his work on the Quartermaster Department and Union
soldiers’ rations, lists in detail the typical garrison ration. This consisted of twelve ounces
of pork or bacon or a pound and four ounces of salt beef and a pound and a half of hard
bread or a pound and six ounces of soft bread. 165 In addition, for every one hundred
rations, fifteen pounds of beans, ten pounds of rice, ten pounds of coffee, fifteen pounds
of sugar, four quarts of vinegar, three pounds and twelve ounces of salt, and thirty pounds
of potatoes (when practical). According to the 1864 census, 335 individuals received
rations in February alone, with half or quarter rations going to most of the population,
unless it was a mother with children. Union troops in St. Augustine were dolling out 236
complete rations per day. 166
St. Augustine certainly proves Ash’s assertions that across the occupied South,
the antebellum community was significantly changed by the years of war, deprivation,
and dissatisfaction. The town was fed by U.S. troops from the time of its occupation
163
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through the close of the war. Humanitarian efforts did not win over southerners and
civilian resistance led to martial law, restrictions, and finally expulsions that rocked the
community. It cannot be overstated how great the damage to the community was.
Notwithstanding being one of the most stable occupation locations in the country, St.
Augustine never-the-less suffered greatly during the war. Losing forty-eight percent of its
original population with a loss of twenty-five percent in overall population numbers, the
demographic shock to the community would be felt for the remainder of the decade.
The final year of the war in 1865 did not pass by without incident. Months of
occupation duty, the spreading out of Union forces across Northeast Florida from
Jacksonville to Palatka, increased U.S. control to a greater extent than it ever had in
Florida. Union gunboats controlled the St. Johns River, while U.S. raiding parties
penetrated deep into no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier, confiscating cattle,
supplies, and assisting African Americans escaping to freedom. One raid did not end well
for Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Wilkinson and his detachment of forty cavalrymen, sent to
Volusia to confiscate cotton, as Captain Dickison’s men surprised them and captured the
entire party. 167
The small skirmishes that occurred across Florida in the waning months did little
to change the war’s outcome. By April 9, 1865, General Robert E. Lee had surrendered to
Union forces, effectively ending major combat operations in Northern Virginia. Shortly
after Lee’s surrender, John Wilkes Booth assassinated Abraham Lincoln at Ford’s
Theatre. The two events occurred so close together that news of the surrender and
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assassination reached St. Augustine on the same steamer. 168 The Civil War in Florida
officially closed on April 26, 1865, when General Joseph E. Johnston surrendered all
forces in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida. With the close of the conflict, soldiers and
civilians began thinking about the future and the coming struggle of rebuilding their lives.
Andrew Anderson, a native of St. Augustine living in New York, lamented Lincoln’s
death, fearing it would bring terrible retribution from the North on the South. Already
disturbed with the death and destruction that the war had wrought, Anderson wrote his
wife, “I wonder how many of the Augustinians of the olden time will ever come back.” 169
According to Ash, the war was over, but other battles that had not been resolved
during the war entered a new phase. Though the major question of Union authority had
been answered by military conquest, three factors remained that would plague
Reconstruction: politics, race, and class. With Lee surrendered and the future unclear,
military control remained over St. Augustine, with civil government shut down and
martial law in place until 1868 when the local court system resumed. White southerners
employed numerous methods to fight African American freedom and equality when
deprived of civil government, while some U.S. Army officers used military occupation
policy to try to promote some sort of equality between the races. Q. A. Gillmore began
issuing orders in the Department of the South that would regulate race relations in
occupied southern towns. On April 30, 1865 Gillmore’s order decreed, “Negroes are at
all times, whether a truce exists or not, and at all places, whether within or beyond the
lines, to be treated like white men, subject to such special instructions touching their
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education, support, and colonization as have been given by the War Department to Brevet
Major-General Saxton.” 170
Union officials were not always consistent in their destruction of racial controls
and were at times sympathetic to the lamentations of southern whites in regards to the
freedoms of African Americans. Southerners were not powerless either, as shown by the
petition to Ulysses S. Grant to keep an all-white occupation force in the town. 171 For
instance, the collector of customs in St. Augustine, Thomas G. Foster, and sixty-nine
other individuals petitioned Ulysses S. Grant against the removal of the Seventh U.S.
Infantry for two African American regiments stating that, “negroes will be negroes” and
would retard northern tourists, increase crime, and attract more African Americans to
migrate to St Augustine, whose inhabitants were mostly women and children. 172 African
American troops never did take up permanent occupation in St. Augustine though they
did they guard refugees from St. Augustine during one of the expulsions of 1863.
Ash also briefly discusses the observations of visitors and returning people who
described the scenes of destruction across the occupied South. John Francis Tenney, who
visited Florida prior to the Civil War, returned to the state in 1865 and bought a piece of
land in Northeast Florida. Tenney made several trips to St. Augustine and Jacksonville on
business after purchasing a home and acres of land in Orange Mills. Tenney described St.
Johns County and the countryside around St. Augustine as desolate, “the principal
170
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sufferers were the cattle owners, whose stock was gathered up and transported north for
the use of the Union troops.” 173 Tenney further states that St. Augustine “retained its old
time appearance and methods of living and doing,” signaling that despite the
demographic shifts, the imposition of military rule, and the alteration of race relations, St.
Augustine remained remarkably similar from when Tenney last visited in 1861. The fact
that much of its old architecture survived the war is evidence that unlike other garrisoned
towns, St. Augustine did not witness the type of vandalism and destruction to the degree
that plagued towns like Jacksonville, which had several square blocks burned during the
war. This makes St. Augustine unique in its ability to avoid large wholesale destruction
of entire city blocks. 174
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CONCLUSION
According to Stephen V. Ash, the damage incurred by the war and military
occupation left scars on the towns and landscape of the occupied South. Ash states that
communities were completely changed by the war from the physical damage and
depopulation, as well as the destruction of slavery. Like much of the occupied South, St.
Augustine was changed by the Civil War. Some of these changes were positive; slavery
was removed from the Ancient City, fortifications surrounded the city, new piers were
built, businesses reopened, and trade and tourism resumed. The city’s old architecture
remained intact; making St. Augustine unique in its avoidance of large scale physical
damage to the city’s buildings that were hallmarks of other garrisoned towns like
Jacksonville. Lastly, the presence of Union soldiers in the town up to 1868 may have
even led to the Ancient City avoiding the racial violence of the Ku Klux Klan that
appeared elsewhere in Florida after the Civil War. 175
Other changes were less positive. Though gardens were blooming in St.
Augustine and the architecture was intact, the many trees in town had been chopped
down, caused by the army’s voracious need for fuel and entrenchments. Orange trees
were picked clean by Union soldiers and hungry civilians. Roads in town were in poor
condition and filled with trash as no maintenance was done in nearly five years. Furniture
in homes had been stolen or hacked up for fuel or out of petty vandalism. Houses that had
once belonged to white southerners now were in the possession of northern emigrants,
Unionists, and prominent businessmen who had bought them at the Tax Commission
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auctions. Finally, forty-eight percent of the town’s original inhabitants had left or were
expelled, leaving the city eerily empty.
Confederate soldiers, Unionists, and other refugees slowly returned, but what
happened to many of these refugees still remains a mystery for historians. Some refugees
travelled to the interior of Florida, as was the case of Frances Kirby Smith who settled in
Madison during the war. Many of St. Augustine’s displaced population settled in Middle
Florida. Families such as the Putnams, Gibbs, and Smiths lived in Quincy and Madison,
while a small “St. Augustine colony” headed by Dr. P. M. Myers established itself in
Monticello. Other refugees travelled far and wide; Gumersindo Antonio Pacetti, one-time
mayor of St. Augustine, resided in Cuba after the war, even holding a dinner in honor of
Confederate General and former Vice President John C. Breckinridge in June 1865. With
the war over, many Confederates fearing retribution after Lincoln’s assassination went
into exile in Cuba. 176
The destruction in no-man’s-land surpassed that of the garrisoned city. Trees had
been chopped down around town for fuel and to clear fields for effective fire to defend
St. Augustine. Houses outside of town had been torn down or vandalized by Union
soldiers in reprisals to guerrilla activity. Lumber yards, salt works, and other business
interests were burned and confiscated by both Union and Confederate forces. Horses and
beef herds had been either slaughtered or confiscated, leaving the countryside
depopulated of livestock. The railroad to Ticoi which had been started near St. Augustine
before the war was torn up. The boats along the St. Johns River that U.S. and
Confederates forces destroyed to prevent the crossing of people and information from one
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side to the other now stifled the resumption of trade between the coast and Florida’s
interior. Lastly, the population in no-man’s-land suffered due to persecutions of
Unionists, Confederate sympathizers expelled by Union soldiers, while slaves and
disaffected southerners were removed by Confederates to Florida’s interior. By 1865, all
of these actions left the countryside deserted.
For those St. Augustinians who remained or returned to the Ancient City after the
war, many wondered if their confiscated property would be returned or if compensation
would be delivered. Union forces, enabled by the confiscation acts, requisitioned property
and materials that could aid in the Union war effort from suspected Confederates
sympathizers. However, no historian has ever been able to quantify how many St. Johns
and St. Augustine civilians were Unionists who had their property confiscated. The
Southern Claims Commission, a Congressional body designed to reimburse Unionist
southerners who had their property requisitioned, recorded sixteen individuals from St.
Johns County who were part of the claims process. The records indicate that out of the
sixteen claims, only four were paid out, and the amounts paid were less than the
requested amount. Given that well over ten percent of the population of St. Augustine
took the oath of allegiance, it is logical to assume that the payouts by the claims
commission never compensated the majority of southerners who had their possessions
confiscated. 177
The three overarching factors of Ash’s occupation model, conciliation’s
abandonment due to southern resistance, the zones of occupation, and changes to the
southern community can be successfully applied to St. Augustine’s Civil War experience.
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The first chapter set up the discussion of these overarching factors in keeping with Ash’s
model by highlighting the lead up to war, the fear of invasion, the evacuations of
Confederates, and the condition of the town upon initial Union occupation. In the
antebellum period, southerners in St. Augustine had brought the question of secession to
the forefront of public debate. Prior to secession, men organized themselves into units for
home defense, while women did everything in their power to support them. Once
secession was adopted, these men and women carried their state out of the Union,
tightened slave controls, increased patrols, confiscated U.S. government arms and
property, and nervously watched the coastline for any sign of Union gunboats’ approach.
Once U.S. forces landed, southerners braced for the very worst, finding instead bold
proclamations of friendship from conciliatory Union officers. These southerners, rather
than openly resist at first, watched and waited as U.S. soldiers first took control of these
towns.
The second chapter discussed the three overarching factors of Ash’s model in the
early occupation period, March 1862 to January 1863. The first factor was resistance to
Union occupation and the eventual abandonment of the Union’s conciliatory approach. In
St. Augustine, like much of the occupied South, Union troops found that southerners
would not greet them as liberators, but as invaders. Women were openly defiant and
privations began multiplying for soldiers and civilians alike. Violent resistance began to
rear its ugly head in the form of Confederate irregulars who persecuted Unionists, caught
escaped slaves, and attacked U.S. pickets and patrols. Frustrated by southerners, vengeful
for the deaths of friends at the hands of partisans, U.S. forces abandoned conciliation
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slowly, engaged in reprisals, and started the process that led to expulsions of hundreds of
southern civilians.
The next factor applied to the early occupation period in the second chapter was
the creation of three unique zones of occupation due to the resistance of southerners.
These zones Ash labeled as: garrisoned towns that experienced direct Union presence,
no-man’s-land that surrounded these garrisoned towns and were frequented by Union
soldiers, and the Confederate frontier that was subjected to rare Union raids. These zones
of occupation were successfully applied to St. Augustine; the Ancient City was a typical
garrisoned town, surrounded by a no-man’s-land that stretched from the east bank of the
St. Johns River all the way to New Smyrna, with a Confederate frontier extending from
the west bank of the river. Union forces from St. Augustine and Confederates from the
frontier raided and skirmished with each other in this no-man’s-land. The Confederate
frontier experienced rare raids at the hands of Union troops who used Florida’s unique
topography to ship troops up and down the St. Johns River.
The last factor that was applied to the early occupation of St. Augustine was
changes to the community. Southern communities, according to Ash, were substantially
changed by military occupation. The resistance from southern civilians caused Union
soldiers to burn down homes in no-man’s-land that were frequented by guerrillas, destroy
boats to prevent trade and mobility, impose harsher penalties on disloyal persons,
beginning a process that eventually led to forced expulsion. The damage to no-man’sland, the depopulation it and St. Augustine suffered, and the economic stagnation all
confirms Ash’s generalizations about changes made to southern communities during the
early occupation period and are applicable to St. Augustine, Florida.
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These three factors, conciliation abandoned, zones of occupation, and changes to
the community all continued into the late occupation period. As 1863 dawned, U.S.
troops abandoned conciliation wholesale as expulsions of southern civilians increased,
with hundreds of women and children placed on transports and shipped out of St.
Augustine. Guerrilla warfare in no-man’s-land became problematic, with dozens of
Union soldiers being captured and killed, while Unionists were still persecuted and in
many instances killed. All of these events and factors taken together inevitably led to
significant changes in the southern community. These changes to southern communities
are best exemplified in the forty-eight percent drop in original inhabitants of St.
Augustine.
Though Ash’s model is applicable to St. Augustine, it is by no means perfect.
There are several facets of Ash’s argument that are more complex than he depicts and
other aspects of the occupied South which he glosses over. Ash presents several
arguments pertaining to the rural community and the accepted social order of planters,
plain folk, and slaves that existed prior to the war. However, works by other historians
have illustrated that such uniformity never existed in the South. Edward E. Baptist is one
such historian who challenges the depiction of a uniform “Old South,” and illustrates that
the expansion of slavery, class conflict, and the nature of the frontier created differences
in the Old Southwest as it was gradually settled. 178
Ash’s model also predates Mark Grimsley’s work on Union war policy toward
southern civilians and Ash’s description of the changes to Union war aims fails to capture
the nuance and complexity of this change. Ash also fails to treat African American
slaves, freedmen, and soldiers in his work, focusing instead on white southerners
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attempts to curb black freedom. Ash’s focus reflects the division between wartime
occupation, Reconstruction, and African American studies in Civil War historiography in
the 1990s.
With the war over, the reader is confronted with one last drawback of this study,
because Ash ends his analysis at the end of the Civil War, and does not take the conflicts
that he delineates during the war into the Reconstruction period. The efforts of white
southerners to curb black freedom, which he briefly covers in his work, are not extended
to the end of the war. This is a lost opportunity to explore the new conflicts and methods
that white southerners employed to fight against orders of racial equality, exemplified by
the order of General Gillmore. One is left wondering if the changes incurred during the
war lasted throughout Reconstruction and if the destruction of slavery led to any
temporary or sustained changes in race relations. Furthermore, Union troops and African
Americans appear as passive players by the end of the war. Union troops appear to
casually back away from the South despite a few pronouncements about social equality.
African Americans are portrayed as passive victims awaiting the resurgent wrath of
southern whites during Reconstruction. Both generalizations do little to clarify the
experiences of these groups at the end of the Civil War. 179
With the evolution of new military history into the twenty-first century, historians
like Judkin Browning have attempted to bridge this gap with comprehensive studies of
Union soldiers, African Americans, and white southerners in the occupied South. This
thesis serves as a stepping-stone for future studies of St. Augustine during the Civil War.
With Ash’s model successfully applied to the Ancient City, a following study applying
Browning’s conclusions to St. Augustine and St. Johns County is required to test his
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assertions and to replicate his scope that bridges the divisions that existed in military
occupation historiography. With that accomplished, a book length study that incorporates
both approaches should be attempted for St. Augustine, St. Johns County, and all of
Northeast Florida.
As the sources indicate, Stephen V. Ash’s assertions about the changing of Union
war aims due to southern resistance, the zones of occupation, and the changes in the
southern community ring true for St. Augustine. Prior to the war, like most southerners,
St. Augustinians feared that in the coming war, Union barbarism would unleash a torrent
of destruction, rape, pillage, and suffering that would touch every corner of the South.
This fear led most St. Augustinians and southerners to flee or grudgingly accept U.S. rule
in the hopes of preventing the destruction of their town. Once it became clear to St.
Augustinians that Union policy intended to be conciliatory, resistance began to blossom
in the forms of non-violent insults and social snubs from citizens to outright violence
from Confederate raiders, partisans, and guerrillas. This resistance over time induced the
Union to adjust their war aims, adopting hard war policies that evicted St. Augustinians
from their homes, confiscated their property, and changed the accepted racial and social
mores, which had operated for decades. All of these circumstances combined to change
the white southern community. This resulted in a forty-eight percent drop of original
inhabitants, leaving empty homes, destitute families, broken kinship ties, and new
problems of race relations.
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APPENDIX A: ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN NORTHEAST
FLORIDA
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APPENDIX B: OCCUPYING UNION REGIMENTS FOR ST.
AUGUSTINE
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The Union occupation of St. Augustine lasted from March 1862 to 1868. In the
course of that time, eight regiments served in the city. A table of the progression of Union
occupation will highlight the high turnover rate in the Department of the South. It was not
at all uncommon for companies from different regiments to occupy St. Augustine at the
same time, moving in and out of the town based on the military expeditions being
launched in the Department of the South, like the attempts to take Charleston in 1863 or
the Olustee campaign in 1864. Furthermore, requests for troops from other commanders
in different military departments could draw away troops, like during General Ulysses S.
Grant’s Virginia campaign in 1864. The following table simplifies the issue of multiple
companies in St. Augustine by listing the regiment in command of the post. This topic of
troop rotation and the effect on the occupied South is not covered in Stephen V. Ash’s
work and illustrates one of St. Augustine’s unique occupation factors. 180
Fourth New Hampshire
Seventh New Hampshire
Seventh Connecticut
Forty-Eighth New York
Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts
Tenth Connecticut
Seventeenth Connecticut
Seventh Regular U.S. Infantry

March 1862 to September 1862
September 1862 to June 1863
June 1863 to August 1863
August 1863 to September 1863
September 1863 to February 1864
September 1863 to February 1864
February 1864 to July 1865
July 1865 to 1868
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APPENDIX C: COMMANDERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
SOUTH
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The order of the commanders of the Department of the South, like the regiments
who served in St. Augustine, is convoluted. As illustrated, the commanders of the
Department of the South changed often. This high rate of turn of among commanders
affected the occupation of the town, as soldiers and civilians were forced to readjust to
commander’s leadership style. This high turnover rate no doubt created an air of
uncertainty about the fate of the town and how policy would be implemented. Though
Stephen V. Ash does discuss the wide latitude that commanders were granted without
clear orders from the Lincoln administration, he does not analyze how the quick turnover
of commanders could affect the implementation of occupation policy. 181
Thomas W. Sherman
David Hunter
John M. Brannan
Ormsby M. Mitchell
John M. Brannan
David Hunter
Quincy A. Gillmore
John P. Hatch
John G. Foster
Quincy A. Gillmore

June 1861 to March 1862
March 1862 to September 1862
September 1862
September 1862 to October 1862
October 1862 to January 1863
January 1863 to June 1863
June 1863 to May 1864
May 1864
May 1864 to February 1865
February 1865 to June 1865
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